ABSTRACT
Contemporary discussions of practical reason often refer vaguely to the Kantian conception of reasons as an alternative to various means-ends theories, but it is rarely clear what this is supposed to be, except that somehow moral concerns are supposed to fare better under the Kantian conception. Immanuel Kant accepts the traditional equivalence between what one rationally ought to do and what is good to do; but rational choice is prior to goodness. Kant is an ‘internalist’ about reasons: there are, in addition to reasons for believing, reasons for acting, and to acknowledge these is to be disposed to follow them. As Kant says, what is analytic is not simply that ‘whoever wills the end, wills the means’ but that this is so ‘so far as reason has decisive influence on his actions. Kant held, of course, that the Hypothetical Imperative is not the only necessary principle of rational conduct, even though it is the only analytic one.
