ABSTRACT
T here is a notable dialectic in current emotion theory and research. On the one hand, and as the contributions to this volume attest, emotions are highly social. One of the basic functions commonly ascribed to emotion (e.g., Scherer, 1984) is that of social communication. Through their observable, expressive manifestations (postural, facial, vocal, etc.) emotions are thought to communicate much to members of the social environment about the emotional person's thoughts, feelings, and likely behaviors—for instance, whether the person is likely to strike out in anger, to give up and withdraw in sadness, or to perceive a serious danger in fear. This information can then be used by the perceiver to regulate his or her actions to both the expressive individual and the affect-eliciting circumstances—to apologize to the angry person, to offer support and comfort to the sad one, or to become more vigilant to potential danger in the fear-inducing circumstances. In addition, as several contributions in this volume emphasize (e.g., Bless & Fiedler, this volume; Clore & Storbeck, this volume; Forgas, this volume; Huppert, this volume; Sedikides, Wildschut, Arndt, & Routledge, this volume), our own emotional states affect our perceptions and cognitions in ways that influence decision making (e.g., Baumeister, Vohs, & Tice, this volume), interpersonal behaviors (e.g., Ciarrochi & Blackledge, this volume; Holmes & Anthony, this volume), and a broad array of additional behaviors that have social implications.
