ABSTRACT
As outlined in Chapter 1, it is widely taken for granted that the primary response to crime should be the formal prosecution of offenders and, where appropriate, their punishment in the name of protecting the public. In this process responsibility for defining and responding to crime is taken by official state agencies, ideally acting with impartiality and fairness. However, the investiture of such powers in the state has also long been a cause for concern. Critics have maintained, for example, that formal criminal justice is overwhelmingly counterproductive in relation to its objectives. Social problems, conflicts, harms and antagonisms are an inevitable part of everyday life and their ‘ownership’ is lost if they are delegated to professionals and specialists promising to provide ‘expert solutions’. When professionals intervene, the essence of social problems and conflicts is effectively ‘stolen’ and re-presented in forms that only aid their perpetuation (Christie, 1977). Formal criminal justice also appears to be mired in recurrent crises: of effectiveness, of lack of public confidence, of arbitrary and unprincipled decision making and of reproducing social inequalities. It is in such negative climates that reformers have also long searched for more inclusive and less destructive means of responding to crime: means that are intended to return ‘ownership’ of the conflicts, disputes and troubles associated with crime to those most intimately involved; that is, their perpetrators and victims.
