The Arab Gulf States

Over the centuries, and long before the discovery of oil, the Arabian Peninsula was caught in the whirlwind of permanent geo-strategic confrontations. Three chokepoints, the Strait of Hormuz that separated the peninsula from Iran, Bab el-Mandeb that isolated it from the African continent and, after it was inaugurated in 1869, the Suez Canal in Egypt that opened a waterway into the Mediterranean, effectively determined the fate of Arab nations caught in the vagaries of isolation and poverty. Overcoming serious environmental challenges, the peoples of the Peninsula survived, though observers mistakenly assumed they lacked strengths as few intruders ventured deep in the heart of the Peninsula to find out. When confronted by larger encroaching naval forces like the Portuguese, the French, and the British, coastal Arab powers retreated. To be sure, and while Arab navies suffered against superior fleets, most Arabian Peninsula tribes maintained minimum standing naval forces in the Gulf or the Red Sea though Omani sailors reached China and, in a quirk of history often overlooked by historians, provided the captain who navigated Vasco da Gama and his Portuguese ships that sailed through the Cape of Good Hope in 1498. ¹ Notwithstanding such accomplishments, Arab maritime prowess was limited not because of any shortcomings in capabilities, but simply because of land trade preferences. Even conquering Ottomans were far more interested in overland commercial routes instead of developing naval capabilities, which explained their limited deployments or successes against the Portuguese. ² Ottoman weaknesses were further demonstrated when Constantinople, then at the height of its military strength, “exposed Egypt to invasion by Napoleon in 1798,” which was carefully noted by both Persian as well as Arab societies along the Red Sea, and inside the Gulf. ³