ABSTRACT
This article focuses on the perpetrators of acts of genocide, and seeks to understand the construction of a willingness to kill. Based on interviews and archival research, it explores the historical context of the Guatemalan army high command as it planned and launched a series of operations that transformed counterinsurgency into acts of genocide. The research supports the chain of command arguments that were important in the verdict against General Ríos Montt, but also explores military policy and procedures that, from the mid 1970s, laid the groundwork for that transformation. How were young and mostly indigenous and illiterate soldiers, with a low level of indoctrination, transformed into genocidal perpetrators, committing massacres against indigenous peoples and other non-indigenous communities? I argue that the decisive factors were group dynamics, particularly specialization and a complex relationship between incentives and personal ambitions for a career inside the armed forces. There were also other factors, constant for all troops, which contributed to defining the adversary and constructing the willingness to kill, including racism, indoctrination, division of labour and the development of the guerrilla war. The article examines a complex set of interactions running in both directions along the chain of command, but focuses most intensely on the last step in that chain, on those actually involved in the massacres committed in the rural areas.
