ABSTRACT
The proposition that group membership (collective self or self-esteem) influences personal self (or self-esteem) has acquired truism status in social and personality psychology. This broad proposition was supported initially by data suggesting that enhancement of the collective self (i.e., ingroup bias in the form of intergroup discrimination) provided a boost to personal self-esteem (e.g., Oakes & Turner, 1980). A flurry of research, however, criticized the initial findings both on methodological (e.g., Berkowitz, 1994) and epistemological (e.g., Schiffmann & Wicklund, 1992) grounds. Indeed, subsequent evidence has not been consistent with the hypothesis (for reviews, see Aberson, Healy, & Romero, 2000; Brown, 2000; Rubin & Hewstone, 1998). Alternative support for the proposition comes from a more refined need-deficit hypothesis, according to which low personal self-esteem motivates intergroup discrimination as a means of replenishing the personal self-esteem deficit (e.g., Hogg & Abrams, 1990). Findings, however, are inconsistent with such a hypothesis and indicate that individuals low in personal self-esteem are less likely to engage in ingroup bias than those high in personal self-esteem (Aberson et al, 2000; Crocker & Luhtanen, 1990). In summary, the collective self does not seem to decisively shape the personal self.
