ABSTRACT
Call the concept of mind the concept of that which thinks, or is capable of thinking, in a broad sense of ‘thinking’ that includes not just episodes of conscious deliberation but also believing, desiring, sensing, perceiving, purposively moving and acting. I shall use the expression ‘concept of mind’ in this way. Such, for example, is the manner in which Armstrong (1981) and Moore (1953) deploy the concept. I shall suppose the mind to be that which thinks, in the broad sense. Thus understood we may say that creatures deploying the concept possess (to use the current term of philosophic art) a folk psychology. In conceiving of themselves as thinkers they are able to explain and predict behavior—to represent behavior as the product of thought. A typical putative example of use of the concept to explain or predict is the case where someone ascribes thought to another to understand the motivation behind the person's behavior. For example, someone pictures another person as thinking it would be best to walk to the river; his walking is anticipated and explained by appeal to his being moved by thought.
