Introduction

In the period since the 1985 change in the Soviet leadership there has been, understandably, a good deal of emphasis on Gorbachev the personality. In terms of self-projection, handling of the media, and presentation of policy departures, the new General Secretary has undoubtedly struck a new note, set a new style. The aim of the present work is to try to get beyond the stage management, to peel off the packaging, and evaluate the policy departures on their own merits. In so doing we have not lacked for formal pronouncements to serve as a starting point. With planning experiments, agricultural reorganisations and arms reduction proposals, not to mention intra-Comecon vicissitudes and ubiquitous personnel changes, our problem in the present context was rather one of selection. The principle we chose emerges directly from our title. We are interested in prospects for reform. That is why we have not devoted special chapters to, for instance, nationality relations, religion and political dissent. In terms of evaluation of likely secular trends in Soviet polity and society, those and other dimensions may be as important as any. But it is very improbable that they will be the subject of specific, major legislation or negotiation this year or next. That is why we have concentrated on Gorbachev’s internal politics, Soviet foreign policy in all its ramifications, and economic reform. Other issues are introduced to the extent that they shed light on these, our central concerns. They are, needless to say, intertwining themes. We have tried to point up the linkages as we go along, and to pull together as many threads as possible in our Conclusion. Certainly the full pattern has not yet been revealed to us, and in the last analysis this must remain a provisional assessment. But, of course, ‘il n’y a rien qui dure que le provisoire’.