ABSTRACT
In her pessimistic assessment of the prospects of reform in the USSR which we quoted in Chapter 1, Agnes Heller goes on to argue that ‘nuclear arms reductions, beneficial as they are internationally, have absolutely no impact on the oppressive nature of the internal Soviet system’ (Heller, 1985, p. 26). In contrast, Archie Brown is optimistic about the prospects for domestic reform, but suggests that ‘an increase in international tension and an accelerated rate of military expenditure would exacerbate the difficulties of economic reform and diminish the prospects for significantly enhancing Soviet economic performance’. He goes on to conclude that ‘it therefore makes sense for Gorbachev to reassess Soviet foreign policy to see what innovation might be required in this area, too, to complement his ambitious domestic programs’ (Brown, 1986, p. 1060). It is clear that behind these differing conclusions lie not just differing sets of predispositions and sets of empirical evidence, but also, and crucially, differing conceptions of reform and change, and differing understandings of the relationship between domestic and foreign policies. Before proceeding to the analysis of Soviet foreign policy developments and the assessement of the prospects for evolution in this area, therefore, we must review our central concepts.
