ABSTRACT
For many years, researchers and theorists have supposed that it was Piaget’s description of a succession of different logics underlying sensorimotor, concrete operational, and formal operational thinking that set his views apart from virtually all previous accounts of human growth. There is no doubt that Piaget’s careful examinations taught developmentalists to “see” children’s reasoning and problem solving in a new way—not as error-ridden versions of adult thought, but as samples from different systems of problem-solving. But paradoxically, it is precisely this investment in the thinking processes of children that has enabled subsequent investigators to learn that if one considers materials, instructions, or motivations, the growth of knowledge is both much more uneven and much more local than original Piagetian descriptions would have it (Fischer & Silvern, 1985). Thus, the enduring legacy of the Piagetian perspective may lie outside of the details of stage theory.
