ABSTRACT
This chapter contributes to the study of the empirical status of axioms in theories of fundamental measurement, following the lines of a previous study (Adams, Fagot, & Robinson, 1970) (see also Pfanzagl, 1968; Adams, 1974; and Manders, 1977). Here we will focus on theories of subjective probability representation, specifically considering variations on theories discussed in Krantz, Luce, Suppes, and Tversky (1971), section 5.2; Fine (1973), section IIB; Narens (1985) section 2.8e; and Roberts (1979), section 8.5, which in turn are variations and refinements on theories due to de Finetti (1937); Koopman (1940); and Savage (1954), section 3.2. To get an idea of our problems and approach, let us go quickly over the methodological and model-theoretic background.
