ABSTRACT
One of the oldest and least productive recurrent dichotomies is that which distinguishes determinism (as a concept and/or a set of causal mechanisms) from free will (as a concept and/or a set of causal mechanisms). Among the problems generated by a belief in the validity of this categorical distinction is the assumption that science and “scientific method” are predicated upon the former, and require a renunciation of free will in any of its manifestations. As noted by Howard and Myers (1989), free will is not synonymous with the doctrine of nondeterminism, which is, in fact, the true opposite of deterministic models in science. The belief that events (including human actions, thoughts, and feelings) result from some cause(s)—the essence of a deterministic philosophy—is not innately incompatible with a belief in internal (personal, under-the-skin) sources of causation (the philosophy of agency, self-determination, internal control, or, more commonly, free will). Clearly, then, one can maintain a belief in the doctrine of determinism while simultaneously believing that some event antecedents (some of the time) are person centered.
