ABSTRACT
It long has been recognized that individuals suffering from emotional disorders commonly experience pronounced elevations of negative ideation. In clinical depression, for example, thoughts concerning hopelessness and low self-esteem tend to predominate (Beck, 1967; Eaves & Rush, 1984), whereas clinically anxious patients frequently report thoughts concerning personal vulnerability and the anticipation of harm (Beck, Laude, & Bohnert, 1974; Hibbert, 1984). Recent conceptual accounts of emotional pathology (e.g., Beck, 1976; Beck, Emery, & Greenberg, 1986) place particular emphasis on such patterns of thinking not only as markers of clinical disorders, but also as potential causes of these clinical conditions. If this is so, then in order to understand the aetiology of emotional pathology, it becomes necessary to identify the cognitive basis of the abnormal thinking patterns that underpin such clinical conditions. This realization has catalyzed a great deal of recent research into the association between emotional vulnerability and idiosyncratic patterns of selective cognition (cf. C. MacLeod & A. Mathews, 1991; A. Mathews & MacLeod, 1994; J.M. Williams, Watts, C. MacLeod, & A. Mathews, 1988).
