ABSTRACT
In an autobiographical manuscript, Robert M. Yerkes declared: “I shall view myself as an experimental animal whose solution of daily problems ultimately spells out a way of life” (hereafter referred to as RMY); (Burnham, 1976; Hilgard, 1965; Yerkes, 1956, p. 2). Yerkes was a pioneer in uncharted fields. He was guided by some large and abstract assumptions—faith in Darwin, faith in scientific method, faith in the promise of human engineering—but the specifics of his research—the subjects, the methods, the interpretations—reflected pragmatic responses to a complex range of stimuli, including professional mentors, institutional situations, and perceived social needs or opportunities. In Yerkes’ hands the comparative method was not a dictator of specific research agendas but a wide-ranging search for possible patterns in behavior and thought across species. Like many comparative psychologists, Yerkes always had his eye on man and was fairly accused of anthropomorphic tendencies, but he was also an “objectivist” who persistently sought to create a methodology that would command the respect of other scientists, and few scientists could match the variety of his hands-on knowledge of animal behavior or his eclectic inventiveness in research design.
