In recent decades, the psychoanalytic concept of the mind has gained a lot of interest among philosophers and especially among phenomenologists. Much less emphasis has been given to the psychoanalytic concept of the body. The generally accepted view in philosophy is that when psychoanalytic scholars discuss the body, they interpret it as a mere natural scientifi c object-a matter of physiology, biology, and neuroscience with no special philosophical relevance. To be sure, psychoanalysis is indeed (and, from a phenomenological point of view, rightly) trying to avoid reducing experiential life to current neurophysiological circumstances-a move that largely characterizes contemporary psychiatry. However, thus holds the received view, in lacking a proper philosophical framework, psychoanalysis simply falls victim to mystifying descriptions of the foundations of the mind, ending up endorsing a view reminiscent of the Cartesian dichotomy between a disembodied mind (the subject matter of the human sciences) and the material body (the subject matter of the natural sciences).