ABSTRACT
Considerable evidence documents the foundational role that judgments of intentionality play in human social cognition. Even before their first birthday, children distinguish intentional from unintentional behavior and soon learn to recognize the goals and beliefs that motivate intentional action. Adults’ judgments of intentionality are grounded in a sophisticated concept in which they consider five distinct components (the agent’s belief, desire, intention, skill, and awareness); nonetheless, they typically make these judgments extremely quickly. Several recent studies suggest, however, that intentionality judgments are also heavily influenced by moral concerns. Specifically, if a behavior is morally blameworthy, people appear to judge the behavior as intentional even when critical components of intentionality are missing (e.g., intention or skill). When the same behavior lacks moral valence, virtually nobody considers it intentional. If true, these claims would cast serious doubts on the assumed foundational status of intentionality judgments. In a series of studies we examined these challenging findings, hoping to identify the psychological processes that drive them and carefully assessing whether blameworthiness truly guides intentionality judgments.
