Perhaps the hoariest chestnut in the lexicon of Asia’s diplomacy is the claim that the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) sits in the “driver’s seat” of regional cooperation. ASEAN has been identified as playing the leading role in the development of security multilateralism in Southeast Asia, and exporting it to include the wider region through institutions like the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), ASEAN Plus Three (APT), and the East Asian Summit (EAS) (Acharya 1997). ASEAN members chair or co-chair all the important multilateral meetings in the region, and shape the agenda and the content of the chairman’s statement that is often the most tangible outcome. Non-ASEAN states, large and small, have acknowledged this central role, either explicitly or implicitly, by seeking admission and continuing to participate in these ASEAN-centered institutions. This chapter explores how ASEAN’s leadership role has fared in what has

been the biggest period of upheaval in East Asia since the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997-98. It starts by making the claim that the last three years have provided some direct challenges to ASEAN’s leadership of regional multilateralism. Some have come from governments, others from wellconnected and influential non-governmental figures. The chapter examines what has driven this growing sense of discontent. It then explores how ASEAN has fared in the face of these challenges, arguing it has proved remarkably resilient in repelling demands for the creation of alternative, more exclusive forms of cooperation. Employing an eclectic approach to IR theory, the final part of the chapter draws insights from realism, historical institutionalism, and constructivist approaches to multilateralism to explain this resilience.1