ABSTRACT
In this chapter, we will look in more detail at some of the philosophical issues surrounding the idea of non-combatant immunity in war. In particular, we will look at why the principle of non-combatant immunity permits the collateral killing of non-combatants, but prohibits the intentional killing of non-combatants. Usually, this position is explained by invoking the doctrine of double effect (DDE). Since the collateral harms are merely foreseen, rather than intended, this is thought to affect their permissibility. We will look at criticisms of the DDE and consider how just war theorists have sought to revise this doctrine to make it more plausible. We will also consider some suggested alternatives to the DDE. In the second part of the chapter, we will look at the difficulty of explaining or justifying the principle of non-combatant immunity itself. We will focus on attempts to distinguish combatants from non-combatants, and will consider whether there is a plausible criterion that explains why combatants may be attacked, but non-combatants may not.
