ABSTRACT
The impetus for this chapter derives from two characteristics of theory building, both affect-laden, but of very different hedonic tone. On one hand, few pursuits are as satisfying as making theory—there is an immense pleasure associated with attempting to “carve nature at its joints.” Conversely, publication of a theory results in a tension between that relatively static public statement and the much more dynamic conceptualization of the system in question that exists in the mind of the theorist. With respect to the particular case at hand, while I would retain the general framework and certain key features of the original version of action assembly theory (Greene, 1983, 1984), other aspects of that formulation have become less and less adequate characterizations of my own understanding of the output system. Some of the changes from the original version of the theory have been introduced, though not in any systematic way, in subsequent publications (e.g., Greene, 1994, 1995a, 1995b; Greene & Geddes, 1993), while others, such as the conception of the assembly process articulated here, have not been presented in any previous article. Together, these changes constitute a second generation action assembly theory (AAT2) that differs in several important respects from the original.
