ABSTRACT
Since the mid-1990s, cross-Strait relations have often been characterized as “political separation with economic integration” (Wu 1997: 154–69, Zhao 1999: 21–40, Kastner 2009: 30–41). Although quite successful in deterring attempts aimed at seeking independence for Taiwan, China has achieved little in terms of breaking the current political stalemate. For example, public opinion surveys conducted in Taiwan in recent years (shown in Figure 8.1) have normally suggested that some 75 percent of the Taiwanese have given up the option of unification and that under 10 percent still identify themselves as Chinese (Wang and Liu 2004, Keng et al. 2009). These positionings find favor with the United States, which opposes any unilateral attempt to upset the cross-Strait status quo (Goldstein and Schriver 2001, Tucker 2002, Zagoria 2003). Consequently, most Taiwanese expect that cross-Strait relations will remain unchanged for the foreseeable future, no matter whether Taiwan is ruled by the “pan-Blue” camp (the KMT and its allies) or by the “pan-Green” camp (the DPP and other pro-independence parties). Public opinion survey in recent years https://s3-euw1-ap-pe-df-pch-content-public-p.s3.eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/9780203813607/d7a2340d-3e3b-432a-8c63-b06087a03a89/content/fig8_1_B.tif" xmlns:xlink="https://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"/> Source: Data archives, Election Study Center, National Chengchi University.
