ABSTRACT
Global imbalances seem to have become a catchword for putting at least part – if not all – of the blame for the present US crisis on the South, more precisely on some OPEC members, some Asian countries, and China in particular. Already around and presented as a concern by the IMF before the US crash, “global imbalances” were soon singled out as one main reason for the crisis, in the same way the debt crisis of the 1980s was blamed on OPEC (“recycling of petrodollars”) – against facts, truth, and fairness (cf. Raffer and Singer 1996: 127ff., 2001: 133ff.). In plain English: it is claimed that the crisis was not caused by highly leveraged instruments, “liar” and “ninja” (No Income, No Job nor Assets) loans, slack regulation pursuant to the Greenspan doctrine that markets can do no wrong or CDSs (Credit Default Swaps) sold by institutes incapable of doing more than cashing the pertinent fees, and foreseeably going belly-up when these contracts would have to be honoured. At least in part if not mainly, it is China’s fault, as well as the fault of OPEC countries. Lorenzo Bini Smaghi (2008), member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank, titled his speech in Beijing: “The financial crisis and global imbalances – two sides of the same coin”. Predictably, he starts his speech: “When analysing the current financial crisis the temptation might arise to attribute all the responsibilities to the excesses of the US financial system. I think this would be a mistake.” Unlike Oscar Wilde, he proved able to resist temptation.
