Breadcrumbs Section. Click here to navigate to respective pages.
Chapter

Chapter
The near and far enemy debate
DOI link for The near and far enemy debate
The near and far enemy debate book
The near and far enemy debate
DOI link for The near and far enemy debate
The near and far enemy debate book
ABSTRACT
The jihadist movement has been marked by a visceral series of disputes over strategic priorities, and perhaps the most contentious of these disagreements has been over how to liberate Jerusalem. Jihadists have debated whether they should concentrate their efforts on Israel (later they would include Israel’s Western supporters in the same category), which they dubbed “the far enemy” (al-adou al-baeed), or whether they should fi rst attack their own local purportedly apostate regimes, “the near enemy” (al-adou al-qareeb). From 1979 to 1998, jihadism was dominated by those who believed that revolution in the Arab world must precede any confrontation with Israel. From 1998 to 2003, Usama bin Ladin and a small group of lieutenants argued the reverse: that Jerusalem could only be liberated by a direct attack on the far enemy, the “alliance” between Jews and their superpower patron, the United States.1 While the debate inside the jihadist community has become signifi cantly hybridized and fragmented since 2003, the near enemy has seemingly returned as a priority for jihadist action. In an evolution from the pre-1998 near enemy strategy, however, today’s hybridized strategy makes explicit the sequencing of overthrowing those Arab regimes surrounding Israel, followed by an attack on Israel proper.