From psychology to moral normativity

Adam Smith ‘constructs’ the moral world, says Samuel Fleischacker, from some amoral, innate tendencies of human nature. ¹ Along the same line of interpretation D. D. Raphael affirms that Smith gives a psychological genetic explanation of the emergence of moral conscience; ² which originating from our most basic and innate drives, advances to a reasonable account of human moral nature. Psychology – which here, for the sake of clarity, will only refer to ‘our innate desire for pleasure’ – is in this theory like the infrastructure that supports the gradually formed ‘superstructure’ of morality – or the desire for good in itself and for its own sake. ³ Our psychological constitution both sustains and is the condition that enables morality. However, the moral dimension in Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments (TMS) is independent of psychology. Many important interpreters affirm that morality is a mere internalization of social norms, which would ultimately be justified in psychology. ⁴ On the contrary, I will argue that morality is a new and distinct dimension, which emerges from a different source and has a different kind of normative authority. They are distinct spheres that, despite their genetic connection, can be distinguished in Smith's ethics.