ABSTRACT
The Theory of Moral Sentiments is usually regarded as a fine work of moral psychology and/or sociology and, according to the predominant view, must be confined to being just that. Campbell is just one of a number of authors who argue that TMS must not be taken as a piece on (normative) moral philosophy. 1 The fact that in TMS Smith repeatedly claims to merely be explaining standard moral practice lends considerable credulity to their claim. The passage that is usually taken as conclusive in this regard reads: ‘the present inquiry is not concerning a matter of right, [ … ] but concerning a matter of fact’ (TMS II.i.5.10). And, thus, it comes as no surprise that even his contemporaries accused Smith of merely justifying the moral status quo by declaring effective social practice appropriate moral practice. 2 Yet, the passage obviously lends itself to more than just this one interpretation. It could for instance be read as a rejection of first-principle, intuitionist and/or purely rationalist moral theories in favour of a procedural theory of morality where moral facts are established in human practice. 3 This, by itself, does not preclude a supra-positive conception of propriety. 4 Indeed, throughout TMS one can find evidence of a theory for the justification of moral norms, signalling a normative venture. Smith not only describes the socio-moral practices of his day, i.e. he does not merely give a detailed rendering of the normative beliefs effective in eighteenth-century Scottish communities. He also prescribes the conditions for appropriate moral practice. He does not, however, do so in the manner of a rationalist moral philosopher, but against the backdrop of his empiricist beliefs. And this means that a normative theory of moral philosophy must to some extent be a candidate for validation through empirical findings and common sense. It must, to borrow Korsgaardian terminology, display explanatory (empirical) adequacy as well as justificatory (normative) adequacy. 5 It must sufficiently explain why people can be expected to adhere to the moral principles advanced by the theory (or, alternatively, simply demonstrate that they in fact generally do so) as well as convincingly justify these principles.
