ABSTRACT
At the beginning of this book, Christopher Dent propases a subtitle in his introduction that seems to suggest an evolving nature of Northeast Asian regionalismo Is Northeast Asia a region in search for its own regionalism? If so, what kind of regionalism is it heading for? After examining all the chapters included in this book, I suggest that Northeast Asia is a region heading for a multilayered issue-linkage regionalism. Unlike its European counterpart, Northeast Asian regionalism is nowhere near to a highly institutionalized and rule-basis regulatory regime. Nor is it evolving into an EU-like regime. SOllle even suggest that there is no regionalism in Northeast Asia in a literal sense, because rhe regian has neither developed a regional consciousness rhar would facilitate regional cooperation, nor a sense of unity that could ensure long-Iasting stability. Unlike Europe, Northeast Asia cannot be regarded as a cultural or civilization entity, let alone an economic or security community. I However, it would be a mistake to dismiss an evolving Northeast Asian regionalism, simply because it bears no similarity with the lnajor feature of European integration. Moreover, even if European integration sheds no light on Northeast Asian regionalism, it does not mean that no lessons can be learned from the experience of European integration. On the contrary, as sorne chapters of this book delTIOnstrate, we can learn a lot from European experience if it were. compared systematically with that existing in Northeast Asia. The challenge ahead is how do we conceptualize this evolving Northeast Asian regionalismo
2. Historicallegacy and structural barriers
Historically, the region of Northeast Asia has been characterized by numerous events of hegemonic struggle between great powers. As Dent clearIy demonstrates in Chapter 1, apart from colonization efforts of the UK, Germany, Russia, France, etc. in China between the 1850s and 1950s, ]apan, Russia, and China themselves had fought each other over geo-political and economic interests for over a century. For example, Russia exploited China's weakness after the Opium Wars and during the years of 1858-1924 acquired territory equivalent to at least one-third the size of the United States. The Chinese later declared the 'lost territory' acquired by Russia was in fact sovereign itself, inhabited by various tribes, who were neither Russian nor Han Chinese. This implies that the 'lost territory' may one day return to Chinese influence. This implication was fully exploited by the Chinese Communist Party during the Sino-Soviet split in 1958. Moreover, ll1any Chinese are still angered by Russia's push for the independence of Mongolia from China in 1924. In addition to China-Russia animosity, territorial disputes between Russia and ]apan complicated the situation all the more. After Meiji reforms, ]apan had become a major power in East Asia, adopting inlperialist and expansionary policies to counteract the Western powers. In particular, ]apan's imperialist aspiration was in direct conflict with Russia's ambition to safeguard its Far East interest through control over Manchuria, Korea, and the Liaotung peninsula of China. Thus, Russia allied with France and Germany through Triple Intervention in 1895 to deny ]apan the fruits of its military victory over China. This kindled ]apan's resentment toward Russia, leading to a japan-Russia war in 1904-05. Russia's defeat in this consolidated ]apan's status as the major power of Northeast Asia. Yet, the territorial disputes between Russia and ]apan over the Kurile Islands/Sea of Okhotsk area continues, despite a fishing agreement in 1998 that allowed ]apanese vessels to fish around the disputed islands.
