ABSTRACT
The conventional view of US-Iranian relations during the reign of the Shah is that of Iran as the dutiful pro-Western ally of the United States under the aegis of a ruler who owed his position to direct US intervention in 1953 and who remained a US ‘puppet’ throughout his tenure of office. To support this view, factors such as the acceptance of US intelligence gathering facilities on Iranian soil and the unwavering support of the Shah for US actions in South-East Asia are proferred as evidence. Indeed, the major reason given for the Shah’s fall from power is that he was closely identified with the policies and politic-economic philosophy of the United States, with the inference that the United States exercised control over the Shah’s actions and dictated policy from Washington. However, available data from primary sources now indicate that far from taking a lead from the United States and being controlled by the US executive, the Shah himself influenced and often controlled the US policy-making process in pursuit of the goal that dominated his philosophy throughout his reign; the pursuit of the total physical security of the state through the expansion and equipment of the Iranian armed forces to the highest qualitative level.
