ABSTRACT
At the most basic level, minds are structured in ways that permit the successful navigation of challenges related to survival and reproduction. In general terms, the mental operations that are most central to achieving success in the face of such challenges involve the recognition of opportunities and threats and the generation of appropriate strategies for exploiting (or avoiding) them. Although the minds of our hominid ancestors might have been primarily concerned with tasks such as recognizing edible substances and dangerous predators, the modern human mind often has a vast array of preoccupations (e.g., science, philosophy, entertainment, etc.) that bear little direct relation to survival or reproductive concerns. What can explain our comparatively rich cognitive capacities as a species? One compelling answer to this question lies in the extremely social nature of human beings. From early ancestral times, the homo genus has been typified by a high degree of sociality, with individuals living in highly interdependent groups (e.g., Leakey, 1978). To survive and thrive in such a context, the ability to understand other humans is key. Few skills would afford greater advantages than the ability to understand the minds of other group members—to understand their intentions (e.g., to cooperate or compete), to learn what they know (e.g., where threats and opportunities lie), and to manipulate what they believe. Possession of such cognitive skills would greatly increase the probability of successful reproduction, and progeny who inherited these skills would enjoy similar advantages. Indeed, this particular repertoire of skills appears to be fundamental in setting humans (and perhaps their closest primate relatives) apart from other animals (e.g., Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne, & Moll, 2005). From this perspective, the human cognitive architecture owes its sophistication to the affordances and constraints of sociality (e.g., Brewer, 2004; Byrne, 2000; Cummins, 1998; Seyfarth & Cheney, 1994).
