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Chapter

A cut-off of production of weapon-usable fissionable material

Chapter

A cut-off of production of weapon-usable fissionable material

DOI link for A cut-off of production of weapon-usable fissionable material

A cut-off of production of weapon-usable fissionable material book

Considerations, requirements and IAEA capabilities

A cut-off of production of weapon-usable fissionable material

DOI link for A cut-off of production of weapon-usable fissionable material

A cut-off of production of weapon-usable fissionable material book

Considerations, requirements and IAEA capabilities
ByTariq Rauf
BookHandbook of Nuclear Proliferation

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Edition 1st Edition
First Published 2012
Imprint Routledge
Pages 19
eBook ISBN 9780203840849

ABSTRACT

The chapter presents an overview of the Agency's safeguards and verification activities and identifies activities that could be of relevance to a discussion on verification of a future Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT). International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards are applied to 'nuclear material' – any source material or special fissionable material as defined in Article XX of the IAEA Statute. In the IAEA ecretariat's view, the technical objective of verifying compliance with a FMCT would be to provide assurance against any new production of weapon-usable fissile material and the diversion of fissile material from the civilian nuclear fuel cycle to nuclear weapon purposes. The timeliness requirements could be chosen in relation to the time needed by a state to convert fissile materials into nuclear weapons. In a comprehensive safeguards agreements state, any undeclared reprocessing would constitute a clear violation of the provisions of the agreement and the Additional Protocol.

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