ABSTRACT

Since the early 1970s, globalisation has drastically changed the landscape of international political economy. Its definition is heavily discussed, but generally the increasing transnationalisation of a range of production sectors, the emergence of an integrated global financial market as well as the establishment of neo-liberal economics as a new dominant economic consensus can be identified as its core characteristics. We can, therefore, also speak of neo-liberal globalisation. As such, global restructuring has not fulfilled its promises for world-wide development and better living conditions for all. While overall global gross domestic product (GDP) has increased over the last decades, the general inequality within and between countries has grown. The Gini coefficient, which ranges from 0 (perfect equality) to 100 (complete inequality) indicates that global inequality rose steadily from 43 in 1980 to 67 in 2005 (Bieler et al., 2008b: 10). Moreover, ‘for most of the world, economic growth was much slower in the 1980s and 1990s, when the pace of globalisation quickened, than in the 1960s and 1970s’ (War on Want, 2009: 4). This is also reflected in higher unemployment levels. ‘The number of people unemployed and the number in unstable, insecure jobs has actually increased – from 141 million to 190 million (1993 to 2007) and from 1,338 million to 1,485 million (1997 to 2007) respectively’ (War on Want, 2009: 4). Unsurprisingly, we have experienced a growing level of contestation of globalisation since the late 1990s starting with the large-scale protests at the World Trade Organization (WTO) meeting in Seattle in 1999 and embodied in the regular meetings of the World Social Forum (WSF), as well as a whole range of regional and national meetings within the social forum process. At the core of these moments of contestation is a variety of trade unions as well as a wide range of different types of social movements.