ABSTRACT
New Labour’s handling of the Northern Ireland peace process has re-opened debate about the party’s stance on the ‘Irish question’. Rather than being ideologically wedded to the nationalist goal of Irish unity, it could be argued that the party’s Northern Ireland policy has actually been characterised by an ambivalent non-interventionist approach (Edwards 2007b, 2009). This chapter examines the ‘peace strategy’ pursued by Tony Blair’s three administrations between 1997 and 2007 in light of the political discourse articulated by key actors within New Labour itself.1 The interpretive approach in British political science is utilised here to illuminate key variables, such as ideology and values, driving the party’s view on sovereignty in the United Kingdom more broadly. This chapter explains how New Labour’s policy towards Northern Ireland underwent important adaptation under Blair’s leadership and why it finally achieved its overarching objective of consigning the violent conflict to atrophy. In exploring the underlying ideological dynamics of New Labour’s ‘peace strategy’ in Northern Ireland, therefore, the chapter concentrates on three key
components in its political discourse: devolution, bi-partisanship and consent. It is argued here that these concepts underwent significant shifts in meaning after 1994, which permitted Tony Blair to move his party from a position of ‘persuaders for Irish unity’ in the early 1990s to a position of ‘neutral arbitration’ when returned to power in 1997. Moreover, in order to understand its ‘peace strategy’ more fully, these endogenous changes must be considered in light of the exogenous constitutional reconfiguration of the United Kingdom polity. Indeed, it is argued here that New Labour’s policy towards Northern Ireland should be understood – can only be understood – in relation to the party’s successful synergy of both key drivers in its political discourse.
