The limitations of the marginal-utility economics are sharp and characteristic. It is from ﬁrst to last a doctrine of value, and in point of form and method it is a theory of valuation. The whole system, therefore, lies within the theoretical ﬁeld of distribution, and it has but a secondary bearing on any other economic phenomena than those of distribution – the term being taken in its accepted sense of pecuniary distribution, or distribution in point of ownership. Now and again an attempt is made to extend the use of the principle of marginal utility beyond this range, so as to apply it to questions of production, but hitherto without sensible eﬀect, and necessarily so. The most ingenious and the most promising of such attempts have been those of Mr. Clark, whose work marks the extreme range of endeavor and the extreme degree of success in so seeking to turn a postulate of distribution to account for a theory of production. But the outcome has been a doctrine of the production of values, and value, in Mr. Clark’s as in other utility systems, is a matter of valuation; which throws the whole excursion back into the ﬁeld of distribution. Similarly, as regards attempts to make use of this principle in an analysis of the phenomena of consumption, the best results arrived at are some formulation of the pecuniary distribution of consumption goods. Within this limited range marginal utility theory is of a wholly statical
character. It oﬀers no theory of a movement of any kind, being occupied with the adjustment of values to a given situation. Of this, again, no more convincing illustration need be had than is aﬀorded by the work of Mr. Clark, which is not excelled in point of earnestness, perseverance, or insight. For all their use of the term “dynamic,” neither Mr. Clark nor any of his associates in this line of research have yet contributed anything at all appreciable to a theory of genesis, growth, sequence, change, process, or the like, in economic life. They have had something to say as to the bearing which given economic  changes, accepted as premises, may have on economic valuation, and so on distribution; but as to the causes of change or the unfolding sequence of the phenomena of economic life they have had nothing to say hitherto; nor can they, since their theory is not drawn in causal terms but in terms of teleology.