ABSTRACT
The overthrow of President Askar Akaev in Kyrgyzstan in March 2005 was not widely predicted, and it did not lead to the kind of democratic transformation of the political system that some of its supporters expected. The essential mechanisms of Kyrgyz politics – informal networks of influence, based on personal and economic motivation, and shaped by kinship and regional affiliation – proved remarkably resilient, despite the changes in personnel at the top of the political pyramid. The consolidation of a semi-authoritarian system of government under President Kurmanbek Bakiev after 2005 led to disillusionment among some supporters of democracy promotion in Central Asia (Olcott 2007). Early characterizations of the ‘revolution’ as ushering in a new era of political pluralism have been largely forgotten. Sceptics have dismissed the events of March 2005 as little more than a coup d’etat (Knyazev 2005), or an event orchestrated by external forces, primarily the US (Peters 2005).
