ABSTRACT
Introduction Inmid-October 2001, during a routine patrol of thewaters close toAshmore Reef,anislandoffAustralia’snortherncoast,theAustralianNavyintercepteda vessel carrying an estimated 100 people.The vessel, known officially only as SIEV(suspected illegalentryvessel)5,washeldoffshore forfivedaysbefore beingescortedbackintoIndonesianterritorialwaters.Asforwhatoccurredafter that,theAustraliangovernmentdenieshavinganyknowledgeofwhathappened, either to the vessel, or to those on board. It is likely that SIEV 5 returned to IndonesiaandmadelandfallsomewhereonWestPapua(Howard2003:41). ThestoryofSIEV5 is, inmanyrespects,unremarkableand itwent largely unreportedintheAustralianandinternationalmedia,concernedastheywereat thetimewiththethenrecenteventsof11September2001.ThestoryofSIEV5 is, however,worth recounting because, in its apparent simplicity, it illustrates many of the points that I will make below concerning the consequences of counter-traffickingandcounter-smugglingoperations. First,itisimpossibletoknowwhoexactlywasonboard.Weretheyasylum seekers, traffickedpersons,economicmigrants, terrorists,orsomecombination oftheabove?Second,itisimpossibletoknowwhattheconsequencesofSIEV5 being sent back towards Indonesia actually were: did those on board return home,weretheypersecutedonarrivalthere,didtheboatsink,didtheyremain in Indonesia, did they live happily ever after? The Australian government claimednottoknow.Allthatisclearisthattheyweresomeofthemanythousandsofpeople smuggledor traffickedacross internationalborderseveryyear and that what happened to them was a consequence of Australian action to protectitsnorthernborder. Twopoints are importanthere.First, to state that a consequencewasunintended is to state only that the end resultwas not the express purpose of the action.Itdoesnotmean,however,thattheresultisunfavorableorundesirable. Taking thepositionof theAustraliangovernment, ifweassumeforamoment thatthoseonboardSIEV5 wererefugees,preventingthemfromaccessingAustralia’sprotectionregimewasperhapsadesirableconsequence(giventheanti- asylumseekerrhetoricofthegovernmentoftheday).Iftheyendedupaccessing
protectioninathirdcountry,thattoowasprobablyadesirableoutcome.Ifthey werereturnedhomeandpersecuted,thatwascertainlyanegativeconsequence. Othereventualitiesmighthavebeenviewedascompletelyneutral. Thesecondkeypoint is that,whilewecanspeculate,as Ihavedone in the paragraph above, intention is, in practice, almost impossible to ascribe. Discourseanalysisisonepossiblesolutiontotheproblembutheretheresearcheris presentedwithanumberofcompetingclaimsregardingthegoalsandintention ofaspecificpolicy,andestablishingahierarchyofsuchclaimsisanultimately futileexercise.Onemayalsolookfortheoriginsofspecificpolicies,inpolicy papers, in agreements or in legislation. But here one finds a chicken and egg problem.Ifcounter-traffickingmeasureAismandatedbyaninternationalagreement, having appeared a year earlier inwhite paperC on preventing undocumented migrants, and finally made law by legislation B, how then is one to classifyit?Andhowarewetodefineitsintentions? Because of these difficulties, I largely bracket the issue of intention. “Side effect”maybeabettertermbutforconvenienceand,because“sideeffect”isa termwith problemsof its own, I continue to use the phrase “unintended consequence”inthetextthatfollows.Thetwopointsabove,however,mustremain constantcaveats. Inthefirstsectionbelow,Isuggestthatthepathdependencyengenderedby thesecurityfocusofcounter-smugglingandcounter-traffickingregimeshasled tounintendedconsequencesforanumberofdifferentcategoriesofmigrants.I suggestthattheidentityofthoseaboardSIEV5wasoflittleconcerntotheAustralian authorities because the security frame governing their actions allowed little or no room for the consideration of consequences in other arenas: for human rights, for refugees,or for labor, toname justa few. I suggest that the security frame chosen for the governance of counter-smuggling and counter- traffickingregimeshasactedalmostasasetofblinkers.Theseblinkersnotonly makeconsequencesinotherarenasmoreorlessinevitable,butalsomakegovernmentslargelyblindtothemor,attheveryleast,unconcernedwithhowthey playout. Talkingaboutthenegativeconsequencesofmigrationmanagementpoliciesfor refugees and asylumseekers,GuyGoodwin-Gill has argued that “certain actors adapttherulesinaninstrumentalistapproachmoreinclinedtopromoteshort-term politicalgoalsoverlong-termsocialobjectives”(Goodwin-Gill1996:1).Isuggest here that thedivision ismuchdeeper thana simplecleavagebetweenshort and long-termobjectives.Iarguethatbychoosingasecurityframethroughwhichto viewcounter-traffickingandsmugglingactivities,bothshortandlong-termsocial objectives–suchasthepromotionandprotectionofhumanrightsortheprotection ofmigrantworkers – have been largely excluded fromall but a discursive role. Inthesecondsectionofthischapter,Ilookindetailatspecificconsequences of counter-trafficking and counter-smuggling operations. Here, however, it is worthmakingafurthercaveatregardingthelimitsofanalysis.TheUSGovernmentAccountabilityOffice(GAO)arguedin2006that
Thereislittleornoevidencetoindicatetheextenttowhichdifferenttypes ofefforts–suchasprosecutingtraffickers,abolishingprostitution,increasingviable economicopportunities,or shelteringor reintegratingvictims– impact the level of trafficking or the extent towhich rescued victims are beingre-trafficked.
