ABSTRACT
Introduction Although 1974 saw the temporary end of EC attempts to play a major role in the politics of the Middle East, it did not mark the end of European ambitions to do so. The instabilities in their southern neighbourhood and, from the late 1970s onwards, in the Gulf region continued to represent major challenges to the security of the EC member states. Also, the substantive differences between the Europeans and the US on how to deal with the Middle East conflict that had come to the forefront in 1973/4 did not go away in the years that followed. Forging a collective policy on the Arab-Israeli conflict remained an important aspect of the larger objective of improving the EC’s capacity to speak with one voice in the framework of European Political Cooperation (EPC). In the years immediately after the European-US clashes regarding the October War of 1973 and the subsequent oil crisis, the EC countries went along with US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger’s request that they stay out of the search for peace in the Middle East, focusing on strengthening their economic ties with the Arab world instead. Yet, from 1977 onwards, the Europeans sought again to engage in Middle East diplomacy. The policy of the EC member states, working within the EPC framework, on how to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict was refined and expanded, with the Palestinian right to self-determination, the association of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) with peace negotiations, and the need for a comprehensive settlement emerging as key European positions. The Venice Declaration issued by the European Council in June 1980 became the most important Middle East initiative of the EC countries throughout the Cold War. Indeed, it is still widely identified as an early reference point for the two-state solution currently advocated by the EU. The Venice Declaration was largely an expression of the EC’s dissatisfaction with the way the US-sponsored Camp David process had evolved. However, whilst it reflected the emergence of an indigenous European Middle East policy, its lack of implementation revealed the ongoing inability of the EC countries to exert a discernible impact on the ground. The difficulties faced by the Europeans in translating words into action in the Middle East, and the fact that they had succumbed to US pressure to water
down the declaration prior to its publication, explain why transatlantic relations became less strained than had been the case in 1973/4. At the same time, in the post-Venice period, first examples are to be found where the Europeans managed to have an impact on US thinking regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict, thus exerting an indirect influence on conflict resolution in the Middle East. This chapter is divided into four sections. The first examines the European attempts to project stability to the Middle East through the Euro-Arab Dialogue and increased economic relations – or what has been called the EC’s ‘structural foreign policy’.1 The second section assesses commonalities and differences between Europe and the US with regard to Middle East diplomacy between 1974 and 1980, covering in particular the road to Venice. The third section looks at the remainder of the 1980s, which was marked by growing violence between Israel and the Palestinians, a failure by the EC to implement Venice, the low profiles of both the EC and the US with regard to resolving the conflict, and an evolution in US policy that, to some extent, was inspired by EPC positions. Finally, some thoughts will be offered as to how, beyond substantive differences, there were also procedural difficulties that can help to explain the challenges of transatlantic cooperation in general and of implementing Middle East policy in particular.
