ABSTRACT
Introduction The Suez Crisis of 1956 confronted NATO with the extent of its dependence on Middle Eastern oil supplies. For an alliance configured to meet a military threat from the Soviet Union, this realisation brought home the impact that the political force of Arab nationalism would henceforth have on the strategy of NATO. The closure of the Suez Canal from November 1956 to March 1957 highlighted the ease with which the transport of oil to Europe could be stopped by a hostile regime or conflict in the Middle East region.1 The crisis revealed that NATO, preoccupied with planning for a Soviet attack, possessed no coherent policies for maintaining strategically vital oil supplies. As concerns about the stability of the vital Persian Gulf region grew, oil was nevertheless being used in everincreasing quantities to fuel the post-war economic recovery of key members of NATO. Between 1950 and 1965, the share of oil in Western European total energy consumption increased from 10 per cent to 45 per cent.2
