Introduction

This book examines the evolution of European-American relations and the Middle East since 1945. Placing the current transatlantic debates on the Middle East into a broader context, it analyses how, why, and to what extent European and US roles, interests, threat perceptions, and policy preferences in the region have changed, and discusses the implications of these developments for Western policy-­making.­The­main­objectives­are­to­foster­better­understanding­of­conflict­ and cooperation between the allies in the Middle East and to identify major trends in this respect over the past six decades, particularly with regard to the Arab-Israeli­conflict­and­the­issue­of­Gulf­security. There are three main reasons why it is worth taking a closer look at intraWestern discussions and dynamics concerning the Middle East. First, the strategic­significance­of­the­Middle­East­for­the­security­of­Europe­and­the­US­has­ been growing continuously over the past few decades and is unmatched by any other­region­today.­Global­security­challenges­ranging­from­terrorism­and­fundamentalism­ to­ nuclear­ proliferation,­ armed­ conflict,­ and­ regional­ instability­ all­ relate in some way or other to the Middle East. Western energy security has been strongly­linked­to­oil­supplies­from­the­Persian­Gulf­since­the­post-­war­period,­ with the growing energy needs of rising Asian powers being bound to add further geopolitical relevance to the region. And, while the Middle East has been less affected by the processes of globalisation than other parts of the world, it is key in terms of both global trade routes linking Europe to Asia (especially through­vital­waterways­such­as­the­Suez­Canal,­the­Gulf­of­Aden,­and­the­Strait­ of­Hormuz)­and­in­its­capacity­as­a­global­financial­centre.­Being­home­to­some­ of­ the­ world’s­ largest­ Sovereign­ Wealth­ Funds,­ oil-­rich­ Gulf­ States­ play­ an­ increasingly important role in recapitalising Western banks and hold the ability to fundamentally move international markets today. Second, the Middle East has traditionally constituted one of the most divisive issues­in­transatlantic­relations.­The­rift­over­the­legitimacy­and­justification­of­ the Iraq War in 2002/3, which still resonates today, may have been outstanding in­terms­of­its­depth­and­the­bitter­rhetorical­exchanges­that­accompanied­it.­But­ the fact is that, starting with the issue of Palestine in the 1940s, Western allies have been at loggerheads about the right policies towards the Middle East time and again. While there have been periods of cooperation too, there seems to be a

dominant­pattern­of­conflict,­with­the­Suez­Crisis­ in­1956,­ the­Six-­Day­War­in­ 1967,­ the­October­War­ and­ the­ oil­ crisis­ in­ 1973/4,­ the­ bombing­ of­ Libya­ in­ 1986,­the­US­dual­containment­strategy­against­Iran­and­Iraq­in­the­1990s,­and­ the Iraq War in 2003 marking just some of the most prominent examples of intra-Western controversy. The divergence of US and European approaches to the Middle East has been contrary to the interests of either side, as it has limited the effectiveness of their respective regional strategies and has repeatedly posed a serious threat to the cohesion of the alliance at large. Third, given the importance of the region to the West and the frequency of allied discord, there is a remarkable dearth of research on European-American relations and the Middle East. A considerable number of publications cover the long-term evolution of US policy in the Middle East.1 There are also a few books providing equivalent European perspectives.2 However, there are far fewer publications­ that­ take­ a­ transatlantic­ approach.­ Of­ those­ taking­ into­ account­ both­ European and US views, many do so in separate chapters rather than by way of an integrated analysis.3­ Furthermore,­most­ of­ them­cover­ either­ specific­ issues­ (such as the Iraq War in 2003,4­the­transfer­of­power­from­Britain­to­the­US­in­ the Middle East,5­ and­ NATO’s­ role­ in­ the­ Middle­ East6),­ or­ specific­ time­ periods.7 So far, analyses of Western relations in the Middle East that combine a broad and long-term perspective with a plurinational angle have been rare indeed.8 As for the timeframe of this book, the choice of the early post-war period as the chronological starting point for an examination of the transatlantic debates on the Middle East has only partly to do with the founding of the Atlantic Alliance in 1949 and the creation of the ‘West’ in the context of the emerging Cold War. At least as important is the fact that the US, in the context of its ascent as a global superpower, began to pay increasing attention to developments in the Middle­East.­ Prior­ to­ that,­Britain­ and­France­had­been­ the­ dominant­ external­ powers in the region. Although the period of European domination was relatively short in the Middle East compared to other regions, the regional map and state­system­have­been­considerably­influenced­by­the­Europeans.­When­the­US­ entered­the­picture­in­the­Middle­East,­the­British­and­French­imperial­regimes­ were in decline. Since then, European-American relations regarding the Middle East­ have­ evolved­ against­ the­ triple­ background­ of,­ first,­ the­ US­ gradually­ becoming the main external power in the region; second, European powers seeking­to­regain­influence­after­the­end­of­the­Eurocentric­world­while­moving­ from the old imperialist positions in the Middle East to commercially and security-inspired relationships; and, third, a changing strategic context marked by complex regional dynamics and an international system characterised by the Cold­War­and­subsequently­by­US­global­pre-­eminence,­European­unification,­ and power shifts towards non-Western actors prompted by globalisation. ­ With­ regard­ to­ the­substantive­ focus­of­analysis­ in­ this­book,­we­define­ the­ Middle East as consisting of the Arab world plus Iran, Israel, and Turkey. Pakistan and Afghanistan, which are frequently referred to as part of a ‘Wider Middle East’­today,­are­covered­only­marginally.­But­so­are­indeed­many­of­the­coun-

tries that would qualify as being part of the Middle East according to the above definition.­ Rather­ than­ geography,­ it­ is­ policy­ issues­ that­ serve­ as­ the­ major­ structuring element of this book. If it is frequently argued that there are in fact two ‘Middle Easts’, this usually refers to the distinction between the ArabIsraeli­conflict­and­Gulf­security­that­characterises­the­policy-­making­processes­ in many Western capitals. It is these two issues that have long been at the forefront of Western attention when it comes to the Middle East, and it is the evolution of European-American relations with regard to these two issues that this volume­is­mainly­about.­Obviously,­ the­Arab-Israeli­conflict­and­Gulf­security­ have­ geographic­ connotations­ too,­ being­mainly­ related­ to­ the­Levant­ or­Near­ East­on­ the­one­hand­and­ the­Persian­Gulf­on­ the­other.­Yet,­ it­ is­not­Western­ policies­ vis-­à-vis­ these­ areas­ as­ such­ but­ specifically­ vis-­à-vis­ the­ challenges­ related­to­the­conflict­between­Israel­and­its­neighbours­and­the­security­of­ the­ Gulf­that­are­examined­in­this­book.­As­for­other­policy­issues­such­as­political­ reform, Islamism, or terrorism in the Middle East, they are not covered in specific­chapters,­desirable­though­a­comparative­analysis­of­the­respective­transatlantic debates would be. ­ Dating­back­to­the­late­nineteenth­century­and­the­rise­of­Zionism,­the­ArabIsraeli­conflict­gained­growing­international­attention­in­the­1930s­and­became­a­ major international issue after 1945, in the context of the creation of Israel in 1948.­Acting­as­the­mandate­power­in­Palestine­after­the­demise­of­the­Ottoman­ Empire,­Britain­did­not­succeed­in­resolving­the­–­essentially­territorial­–­struggle between the Jewish and Arab populations and decided to return the Palestine file­ to­ the­UN.­This­meant­ that­other­powers,­and­particularly­ the­US,­became­ increasingly­ involved­too.­Britain’s­retreat,­ the­Arab­rejection­of­ the­UN­partition­plan­in­1947,­and­the­declaration­of­independence­by­Israel­in­1948­led­to­ the­first­of­what­became­a­whole­series­of­Arab-Israeli­Wars,­first­between­Israel­ and­its­neighbouring­states­(Suez­1956,­Six-­Day­War­1967,­October­War­1973),­ later­also­between­Israel­and­non-­state­actors­(PLO­in­Lebanon­1982,­Hezbollah­ in­Lebanon­2006,­Hamas­in­the­Gaza­Strip­2009,­plus­two­Palestinian­intifadas).­ Although­both­ the­US­and­ the­Europeans­have­ long­ identified­ the­conflict­as­a­ major source of instability in the Middle East and have been involved in efforts to resolve it for decades, neither they nor any other external mediator has achieved a major breakthrough so far. Although there has been progress in the sense that the principle of a two-state solution has found increasing support, no agreement­ about­ the­ specifics­ has­ ever­ come­ about,­ with­ radical­ spoilers­ on­ either side and substantive differences on issues such as the extent of Israel’s withdrawal­from­the­territories­it­occupied­in­1967,­the­status­of­Jerusalem,­and­ the right of return of Palestinian refugees constituting major obstacles to peace. ­ As­ for­ the­ second­ issue­ of­ Gulf­ security,­ it­ has­ been­ associated­ with­ the­ enormous­oil­reserves­of­the­Persian­Gulf­region­and­Western­energy­needs­for­ many decades. The objective of protecting the vital Western interest of stable access­to­Gulf­oil­against­external­ threats­ like­Soviet­expansionism­and­radical­ regional­actors­has­lent­the­Persian­Gulf­considerable­and­ever-­growing­geostrategic­ relevance­ since­ 1945.­ Similarly­ to­ the­ case­ of­ the­ Arab-Israeli­ conflict,­

Britain­had­been­ the­dominant­ external­ power­ in­ the­Gulf­ prior­ to­ the­Second­ World War, having built up a strong commercial, political, and military presence since the second half of the nineteenth century. Contrary to this case, however, it was­only­the­US­that­moved­into­the­picture­in­the­Gulf­after­1945,­with­the­continental­ European­ countries­ largely­ staying­ on­ the­ sidelines­ of­ Gulf­ debates­ before the 1980s. Another difference relates to the fact that the strategic status quo­in­the­Persian­Gulf­overall­was­conducive­to­Western­interests­in­the­early­ post-war period. It was mainly after pro-Western rulers had been toppled in Baghdad­ in­1958­and,­particularly­ important,­ in­Tehran­ in­1979,­ that­ the­Gulf­ came­ to­be­ increasingly­perceived­as­a­crisis­ region.­Both­ the­Arab­nationalist­ regime of Saddam Hussein and the Islamists that came to power in the Iranian Revolution­came­to­be­regarded­as­sources­of­regional­instability­and­challenges­ to Western security, albeit to different degrees at different times. ­ It­could­be­argued­ that­distinguishing­between­ the­Arab-Israeli­conflict­and­ Gulf­security­fails­to­do­justice­to­the­complexities­of­the­Middle­East,­as­there­ have always been linkages between these two issues, particularly since the 1970s.­Examples­ include­ the­Arab­‘oil­weapon’­during­ the­October­War­1973,­ Israel’s bombing of an Iraqi nuclear reactor in 1981, the founding of the Iraniansponsored­Hezbollah­in­Lebanon­in­the­early­1980s,­Iraqi­missile­attacks­against­ Israel­ during­ the­Gulf­War­ of­ 1990/1,­ the­ growing­ Iranian­ support­ for­Hamas­ and the anti-Semitic rhetoric under President Ahmadinejad, and the intensive Israeli debate about the need and feasibility of air strikes against Iran’s nuclear programme.­ Also,­ the­ Arab-Israeli­ conflict­ has­ traditionally­ represented­ an­ impediment to close US-Arab cooperation in the Middle East, with some US peace­initiatives,­ like­the­Annapolis­conference­in­2007­being­partly­motivated­ by the desire to win Arab support for other regional or global objectives (containing Iran in this case), while the Madrid Conference of 1991 was also the result­of­a­US­pledge­to­push­for­resolving­the­Arab-Israeli­conflict­in­return­for­ Arab­support­during­the­Gulf­War­1990/1.­Still,­for­all­ these­links­between­the­ two policy issues, and despite the fact that some analysts interpret the different crises in the Middle East as one broad regional issue today, there is much merit in keeping the respective analyses separate. While it is important to take the interrelationships into account, the conceptual distinction between the ArabIsraeli­conflict­and­Gulf­security­as­applied­in­this­book­helps­pinpoint­the­segregated nature of the transatlantic debate and sharpen the focus of analysis of the individual chapters. ­ Just­ as­ important­as­defining­ the­Middle­East­ and­ the­policy­ issues­ that­ are­ being­examined­in­this­book­is­a­clarification­concerning­the­actors­in­this­analysis. Neither the ‘US’ nor ‘Europe’ are unitary actors with unitary policies. In the case of the former, the plurality of domestic agencies involved in foreign policymaking that is characteristic of many Western democracies applies very much to the­US,­where­the­policies­of­the­State­Department­and­the­White­House­are­not­ always in sync and where actors outside the administration like Congress and lobby­and­pressure­groups­often­exert­considerable­influence­too.­While­policy­ formulation within the US is not one of the main issues tackled in this book, dif-

ferences between domestic actors will be accounted for to the extent that they are relevant to the research theme. As for ‘Europe’, diversity is obviously greater still, as it includes both the level of individual European countries and the level of bi-and multilateral policy coordination, especially in the framework of the European Community (EC) and later the European Union (EU). The extent to which the efforts of the Europeans to speak with one voice and forge a common foreign­policy­since­the­early­1970s­has­transformed­the­nature­of­the­transatlantic debates on the Middle East will be an important question to address in this book. The notion of ‘European-American relations’ will often imply a common EU position, but the term is also used in this book for cases where the European allies coordinated their policies outside the EU institutional framework. Similarly,­the­term­‘transatlantic’­is­applied­with­regard­to­both­NATO­and­relations­ between the US and European allies in general. All chapters in this book take an integrated approach that combines US and European­perspectives.­Depending­on­the­issue,­the­focus­on­the­European­side­ may­be­on­an­individual­country­like­Britain­or­France,­on­a­group­of­European­ countries, or on collective EC/EU policies. The chapters vary, however, in that some of them analyse transatlantic relations with regard to a key event like a major crisis or war in the Middle East, whereas others cover developments during a given period. There is also a degree of variety when it comes to the authors of the individual chapters, this book being an exercise in building bridges­in­five­major­ways:­between­historians­and­political­scientists;­between­ academics and policy analysts; between experts on European policies and those on US policies; between students of transatlantic relations and students of the international relations of the Middle East; and between established scholars and younger ones. Most contributors had to cross beyond the boundaries of their usual­field­of­research­to­link­Europe,­the­US,­and­the­Middle­East­in­their­analyses. This volume contains the combined results of their endeavours, which hopefully will stimulate further research. ­ The­book­is­structured­into­three­parts.­The­first­part­consists­of­two­chapters­ by­Tore­T.­Petersen­and­Victor­Mauer­on­the­Suez­Crisis­ in­1956­and­the­Iraq­ War­in­2003,­respectively.­Reflecting­the­subtitle­of­the­book,­these­two­chapters­ not only shed light on two of the biggest Western crises concerning the Middle East­ but,­ taken­ together,­ also­ offer­ insights­ into­ what­ Philip­ H.­ Gordon­ has­ coined a ‘trading of places’ between Europe and the US in the Middle East over the past decades with regard to aspects like their respective roles and policy preferences.9 The extent to which European and US positions in the Middle East have­evolved­and­the­patterns­of­transatlantic­conflict­and­cooperation­that­have­ emerged over time will then be examined in Parts II and III on the Arab-Israeli conflict­and­Gulf­security,­each­of­which­is­structured­along­six­chronologically­ ordered chapters. ­ John­Sakkas­starts­off­the­chapters­on­the­Arab-Israeli­conflict­with­a­contribution­on­Anglo-­American­relations­and­the­Palestine­question­1945-56.­Focusing­mainly­on­the­severe­respective­strains­between­London­and­Washington­in­ the immediate post-war period, he also covers the positions of other European

powers vis-à-vis the foundation of Israel, as well as the gradual move towards Anglo-American cooperation in the search for peace between 1948 and the Suez Crisis that culminated in the joint Project Alpha initiative of 1955. The story is then­taken­up­by­Garret­Martin,­who­covers­the­Six-­Day­War­in­1967­from­the­ perspective of France and the US, i.e., the two main opponents in the respective transatlantic debate. Placing his assessment in the context of the global rivalry between­Gaullist­France­and­the­US­in­the­1960s,­he­deals­both­with­the­policy­ differences­concerning­crisis­management­during­and­after­the­Six-­Day­War­and­ with the larger strategic realignments of both countries, with Paris moving towards­the­Arab­position­in­the­Middle­East­conflict­while­Washington­gradually­deepened­its­ties­as­Israel’s­main­Western­ally.­Daniel­Möckli­subsequently­ looks­at­ the­major­ transatlantic­crisis­ that­ came­about­during­ the­October­War­ and­the­oil­crisis­in­1973/4.­He­does­so­against­the­background­of­the­launch­of­ European­Political­Cooperation­ in­1970­and­the­European­efforts­ to­harmonise­ their­policies­on­the­Arab-Israeli­conflict­and­establish­the­EC­as­a­second­political decision-making centre in the West. Explaining the wide gaps between the EC­and­ the­US­ in­ terms­of­ threat­assessments­prior­ to­ the­October­War,­crisis­ management during the war, and policy preferences with regard to resolving the Arab-Israeli­ conflict­ and­ dealing­ with­ the­ Arab­ oil­ weapon,­ he­ ends­ with­ an­ account of why and how the European challenge to US supremacy in the Middle East­failed,­with­the­US­acting­as­sole­Western­mediator­in­the­mid-­1970s. ­ David­Allen­and­Andrin­Hauri­focus­on­European-American­relations­and­the­ Arab-Israeli­conflict­in­the­later­Cold­War­period.­Covering­developments­from­ the­Euro-Arab­Dialogue­in­1974­to­the­Camp­David­Agreements­and­Europe’s­ return­to­Mideast­diplomacy­in­the­late­1970s,­the­Venice­Declaration­of­1980,­ and­transatlantic­relations­during­the­Reagan­years,­they­point­to­both­the­overwhelming lack of agreement between the EC and the US and the limits of a distinct EC policy during this period. The Middle East peace process that came about in the 1990s is subject of the chapter by Patrick Müller and Claire Spencer. Stressing that this was a good decade overall in terms of transatlantic cooperation­vis-­à-vis­the­Arab-Israeli­conflict,­they­examine­how­the­initial­constructive­ division of labour between the EU and the US was followed by a period of growing EU efforts to enhance its own political role as the peace process stagnated and European frustration with Israel and the US grew. In addition, they provide some valuable lessons to be learned from the mediation efforts in the 1990s.­ The­ final­ contribution­ on­ the­ Arab-Israeli­ conflict­ by­ Costanza­ Musu­ assesses the Middle East Quartet and its implications for the EU and transatlantic relations. It offers a thorough analysis of the meandering history of the Quartet­since­2002­and­comes­up­with­reflections­on­both­where­the­EU­stands­ in its efforts to be an acknowledged diplomatic actor in the Middle East peace process today and how things might evolve in the coming years. ­ The­third­part­of­ the­book­on­Gulf­security­and­transatlantic­relations­opens­ with­ a­ chapter­ by­Malcolm­ Byrne­ on­ Anglo-­American­ relations­ and­ the­ Iran­ crisis­ of­ the­ early­ 1950s.­ Revealing­ some­ striking­ similarities­ to­ the­Western­ debates­on­Iran­half­a­century­later,­he­examines­how­London­and­Washington­

started off with quite different threat assessments and policy preferences when the Iranian oil industry was nationalised, but eventually came out with a joint covert action operation to effect regime change in Iran and strengthen the proWestern­Shah.­Stephen­Blackwell­then­takes­up­the­thread­and­investigates­Britain’s­role­in­securing­the­supply­of­Gulf­oil­to­the­West­in­the­1950s­and­1960s­ and­the­respective­transatlantic­debates­on­burden-­sharing.­With­London­deciding­ to­withdraw­ its­military­presence­east­of­Suez­ in­1968,­ the­prime­ responsibility­ for­ organising­ the­ defence­ of­ Western­ interests­ in­ the­ Gulf­ definitely­ shifted­to­the­US.­Examining­the­evolution­of­US­strategy­in­the­Gulf­up­to­the­ Carter­Doctrine­of­1980­and­the­respective­debates­with­London­and­other­European­powers,­Roland­Popp­discusses­in­his­chapter­how­Washington­continued­ to­subcontract­Gulf­security­in­the­1970s­but­refocused­from­relying­on­Britain­ to strengthening the twin regional pillars of Iran and Saudi Arabia. Although he acknowledges­ the­ significance­ of­ the­ Carter­ Doctrine­ in­ shifting­ the­ strategic­ posture­of­the­US­in­Southwest­Asia,­he­identifies­the­roots­of­the­transformation­ of the US role from an offshore balancer to an extra-regional hegemon already during the twin-pillar period, discussing both the different causes behind the US policy change and the respective reactions in Europe. ­ Peter­ John­ Brobst’s­ contribution­ focuses­ on­ Gulf­ security­ in­ the­ 1980s,­ a­ decade­that­was­rather­conflict-­ridden­from­a­transatlantic­perspective.­Drawing­ analogies­ to­ the­British­ ‘Great­Game’­ concept­ to­ check­Russian­ power­ in­ the­ region in the nineteenth century, he assesses both the regional and global factors that­ contributed­ to­ the­growing­US­engagement­ in­ the­Gulf­ and­ the­ respective­ European reactions and transatlantic burden-sharing debates. The chapter by Gerd­Nonneman­ takes­ the­ story­ further,­ analysing­ the­ transformation­ from­ the­ Cold­War­to­the­post-­Cold­War­era­in­the­Gulf­and­examining­the­evolution­of­ Western­ relations­and­Gulf­ security­ from­ the­extraordinary­degree­of­ cooperation­in­the­Gulf­War­1990/1­to­the­growing­strains­about­dual­containment­in­the­ 1990s,­the­clash­over­Iraq­and­dissent­over­Iran­during­the­first­term­of­the­Bush­ administration, and the lessening of transatlantic tensions since then. The last chapter­ on­ Gulf­ security­ by­ Harsh­ V.­ Pant­ looks­ specifically­ at­ the­ Iranian­ nuclear crisis, which has moved to the top of the Middle East agenda in Western capitals­in­the­past­few­years.­Looking­at­both­the­diplomatic­efforts­of­the­EU-­3­ (France,­Britain,­and­Germany)­up­to­2006­and­the­dual­strategy­of­sanctions­and­ incentives­ pursued­ by­ the­ EU-­3­ plus­ 3­ (i.e.,­ plus­ the­ US,­ Russia,­ and­ China)­ since, he combines an analysis of the path from transatlantic policy differences to a joint approach with a sober warning that a new European-American clash may be looming should the crisis escalate. ­ Taking­into­account­ the­major­findings­of­ the­14­contributions­ in­ this­book,­ the concluding chapter offers an analysis of major trends in European-American relations and the Middle East since 1945. Covering both the region at large and the­two­policy­issues­of­the­Arab-Israeli­conflict­and­Gulf­security,­it­ends­with­ some­ thoughts­ as­ to­ the­ future­ of­ Western­ conflict­ and­ cooperation­ over­ the­ Middle­East­as­US­President­Obama­has­opened­a­new­chapter­in­the­transatlantic relationship.