ABSTRACT
Introduction The Suez Crisis was a low point in transatlantic relations. The intensity of the intra-Western strains was comparable to that surrounding the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Indeed, some have argued that the scale of the allied division in 1956 and its significance in terms of its long-term effects on Western cohesion were even bigger. Whereas France, Germany, and other Europeans proved incapable of preventing the US from intervening in Iraq, US measures to stop the FrancoBritish intervention in Egypt were successful and had a lasting impact on the subsequent strategic posture of Paris and London.1 One notable feature of the Suez Crisis is that France and Britain jointly stood in opposition to the US, rendering this one of the few Middle Eastern crises where intra-European differences were less glaring than the European-American split. Another one is the fact that, in 1956, it was the Europeans who pursued an agenda of regime change and ended up in defiance of the UN. Washington, by contrast, was eager to avoid a military confrontation, subordinating the grievances of the European colonial powers to its Cold War prerogatives. The story of Suez has been told many times.2 The crisis erupted when Gamal Abdel Nasser, President of Egypt, nationalised the Suez Canal in July 1956. With international efforts to resolve the crisis over this strategic waterway making little progress, the British and the French, each for their own reasons, decided to intervene with troops. Together with Israel, they forged a secret ploy: Tel Aviv would attack Egypt, giving Britain and France a pretext for sending in their own forces to take control of the Suez Canal and, if possible, topple Nasser. Launched at the end of October 1956, ‘Operation Musketeer’ turned into a political disaster for both Paris and London. The US publicly condemned the intervention and compelled its allies to withdraw their troops. With the US pulling the plug on the European intervention, it was Nasser who emerged victorious from the crisis, his prestige as the champion of an anti-Western pan-Arabism receiving a considerable boost. This chapter does three things. First, it places the transatlantic split over Suez into the context of Western policies on the Middle East in the early and mid1950s. This will reveal that, whereas the Anglo-American turmoil did not come
out of the blue in 1956, the Anglo-French alliance that emerged was the exception rather than the rule. Second, it looks at British, French, and US interests and perceptions as the crisis unfolded in order to define what this intra-Western conflict was about. Finally, the chapter will discuss the consequences of the Suez Crisis, particularly with regard to transatlantic relations and NATO.
