ABSTRACT
As the battle for central government control of the new state appeared to be being won by Lumumba in the democratic context of the Congo, the constitutional arguments moved to New York in the form of UN debates and whether the representatives of Lumumba or Kasavubu should be recognised as the legitimate Congo delegation. Almost immediately, as the opposing representatives arrived in New York and the Security Council was failing to produce an agreed position, Rajeshawar Dayal, a future American bête noire, arrived in Léopoldville as Hammarskjöld’s special representative in the Congo. Dayal had strong reservations about an allegedly impartial UN protesting that the Katangan secession was primarily an internal matter outside its concern, while justifying its takeover of the airports to assist Kasavubu as non-interference in internal issues. Dayal was to take UN neutrality seriously, not merely its proclamation, just as he took the democratic wishes of the Congo people expressed in the preindependence elections seriously. He was to remain a firm advocate of the need for a broad based democratic regime to control a viable and unified independent state. He was therefore anathema to the Americans because that would inevitably require a contribution from Lumumba or his supporters. In other words he had a radically different set of priorities from the Americans, but any differences with Hammarskjöld never developed because of the actions taken by Mobutu to establish a new Léopoldville government. After Colonel Mobutu had tried to arrest Lumumba on 12 September, a joint session of parliament met on 13 September although it had now been dismissed by Kasavubu and Ileo. With just over half of the elected members present the parliament conferred ‘special’ powers on Lumumba and the following day Mobutu announced an army takeover to ‘neutralise’ both the Ileo and Lumumba governments. Mobutu was born at Lisala in Équateur province, the son of a Force Publique sergeant major who was stationed there. His family was from Banzyville on the northern border of Équateur and the Central African Republic. As such he was a member of the Angbandi tribe, part of the Bangala ethnie, but the Bangbandi are descended from Sudanese people and distinct from the Bantu, who the Sudanese invaders drove south and west. At the Round Table Conference in January 1960 he had been close to Lumumba’s side, but was from the same part of Équateur as Jean Bolikango’s family, of whose success he was
rumoured to be deeply jealous. Mobutu was reputedly very anti-white and according to a journalist in the Congo had always been in favour of taking bribes as a way of compensating for the spoils extracted by white men from the Congo. As early as the first Lumumba government, bribery and corruption in Congo politics was endemic. Mobutu, acting for Lumumba, allegedly bought Jacques Lumbala, the PNP secretary for Kivu province, for 50,000 Belgian francs plus bringing his wife and children to Brussels. Lumumba was then apparently trying to buy one man in each party. The pay-off from Lumbala came with the elections of the president of the Senate when the Lumumbist Joseph Kasongo defeated Bolikango helped by Lumbala buying off 13 pro-Bolikango delegates.1 The coup in September was an early indication of the then colonel’s change of sides and his dislike of politicians. Mobutu’s appointment a week later of a College of Commissioners to run the Congo was confirmation of this. Mobutu’s Commission consisted of young graduates and university students who would attempt to fill the large hole created by the lack of universityeducated Congolese. They were overseen by the Chief Commissioner and Foreign Minister Justin-Marie Bomboko and tasked with administering the country until 31 December 1960. More importantly Mobutu had developed a close relationship with the CIA station chief in Léopoldville, Lawrence Devlin. Devlin was a key player in the by now important CIA task of finding a way to get rid of Lumumba. Evidence for this is clear and the planned use of assassination for Lumumba is well supported by some of those involved.2 Once the US had decided that Lumumba should not be brought back into the government by 15 September, then elimination by assassination was a definite option. There is no available evidence, however, to indicate direct CIA involvement in Lumumba’s death but plenty to implicate those in Léopoldville, Élisabethville and their Belgian supporters. Nor has Mobutu’s emergence in September 1960, or subsequently, been directly linked to the activities or money of the CIA, but it is stretching the imagination to conclude that Mobutu’s emergence, right from the start, was not related to the large amounts of CIA money available in the Congo. At the recent Cold War International History Project witness and documents meeting on the 1960-61 Congo crisis, the Léopoldville CIA station chief confirmed that he had met with Mobutu and given an unauthorised assurance that the US would support the coup. Mobutu had apparently made the coup attempt conditional on US recognition, which Devlin confirms in his memoirs and which emphasise that this support was given without authority.3 What we also know is that on taking over the administration of the Congo, Mobutu, in conjunction with Ileo and Kasavubu, closed the Soviet and Czech embassies and expelled their staff. The aircraft that had arrived in the Congo from the Soviet Union to provide assistance to Lumumba in his campaign in Kasai and in his desire to deal with Tshombe in Katanga, also departed. Therefore the Cold War threat of Soviet influence arriving in Africa through the Congo had been removed. For Hammarskjöld, whatever the threat from left-wing nationalism, it was thus game, set and match in Cold War terms. The way was therefore free for the establishment of an independent state whose ‘independence’ would not be compromised by the
mix of state power and ideology that the Soviet Union in particular represented. However naïve this view may have been it was a view which was increasingly to distance Hammarskjöld from the Americans who were also very much concerned with the nature of the new state but only in so much as its freedom and independence meant freedom from Soviet influence. Any left-wing regime, in addition to its threat to the capitalist socio-economic order, was seen as susceptible to communism by the Americans and on the slippery slope to falling under Soviet or Chinese influence. If either were to happen there would be important implications for the new post-colonial African states in the Cold War. The battle between conservative and radical states, crucial for determining the nature of the international order, was also significant for particular European capitalist interests deemed to have a role in the economic development of post-colonial Africa. The Congo in particular needed to be kept, for the sake of Black Africa’s proWestern future, firmly on the straight and narrow capitalist path to modernisation. Unfortunately the American analysis of what was politically desirable for these particular capitalist interests was not generally shared by the Belgians in the Congo or by many in the metropolitan capitals, including London. The Americans remained adamant that a viable African state in the Congo required unity – but not with Lumumba – and the consul in Élisabethville approached Tshombe to no avail to determine if the Katangan leader would recognise Kasavubu as the legitimate head of the entire Congo. Tshombe argued that the lack of leadership in Léopoldville would threaten a unified Congo for around five years, by which time the economic ties between Katanga and the Congo would be paralleled by similar ties with Tanganyika, Ruanda-Urundi and other central African states. Hence the consul’s conclusion that there would be no point in having further discussions with Tshombe.4 At the same time it became clear that the UN was not able to place restrictions on Tshombe’s forces in their actions against the Balubas who were continuing in defiance of any authority.5 Most disturbing for the Americans was the not tribal warfare but reconciliation between Kasavubu and Lumumba. Timberlake spent considerable time outlining to Kasavubu how an understanding with such an ‘evil man’ as Lumumba would not be in the interest of a peaceful settlement. While Kasavubu and Ileo were happy to provide reassurance that they had no intention of trying for reconciliation with Lumumba it was indicative of the importance the US attached to avoiding the return of Lumumba as an absolute principle.6 The fact that he had not been ‘disposed of ’ remained a cause of concern for the NSC.7 As troubles and violence increased in the Congo, most notably in Kasai and North Katanga where the Balubas and their assertive and defiant protests led to them becoming both victims of Katangan forces and Léopoldville troops, the battle appeared to be on for control and influence in Mobutu’s state. The fact that the situation could well be only temporary provided an added incentive to achieve effective influence over the newly independent Congo state. The issue was particularly sensitive not just for the US and the UN, but for African states. The radical ones (Ghana, Sudan, Guinea) in particular were
unlikely to see beyond Lumumba as the legitimate head of an independent Congo. The fourth emergency General Assembly session, convened by the Security Council after the Soviets had vetoed an African resolution, was only able to come up with a resolution requiring the Secretary General to take vigorous action, in accordance with previous UN resolutions, to seek a speedy settlement by peaceful means of all internal conflicts in the way of a united Congo. This did not prevent Ghana and Guinea from continuing to aid Lumumba to the considerable irritation of Mobutu and the Americans. Two other related issues also became causes of conflict and disagreement as the autumn progressed. The role of the ‘neutral’ UN which, under Hammarskjöld, had played a distinctly partisan role in preventing any possibility of a dangerous Soviet or radical presence in the Congo, remained a key issue. Even with the absence of Soviet aid and embassy staff there was no doubt that the presence of UN Ghanaian troops made life more difficult for Kasavubu and Mobutu.8 This was made into a bigger problem by the return of significant numbers of Belgian civilians. With the American insistence on aid being channelled through the UN to keep the Soviets out, were the Belgians now to continue to be subjected to similar arrangements? Or were Belgian advisers and technicians to be treated very differently to their Soviet equivalents? It was now becoming more difficult to justify opposition to Soviet policies such as the unilateral landing of planes when the United States was after all supporting a military coup to replace a democratically elected (if corrupt) government. The return of the Belgian advisers and administrators would further hinder that Cold War strategy and prevent any appeal to the Afro-Asian bloc. Hence by mid-October the State Department, and Vaughan Ferguson in particular, were sounding out the embassy’s views on whether the Commissioners might be increased through the addition of ‘regional leaders’. If so they could then appear more like members of a Cabinet with the ultimate aim of returning to parliamentary government The need to present the Congo in a more favourable international light was becoming greater as the Americans were considering whether any government without Lumumba could command a good measure of popular support. If that were not the case and a ‘moderate’ pro-western government could not be achieved, then it might be necessary to reconsider Lumumba’s inclusion in a government.9 This was soon to be questioned in Washington when the Belgian foreign minister began arguing that the Congo needed a strong nonmilitary man. With Lumumba ruled out the alternative, for Wigny, was Bomboko. Acting Secretary Dillon was interested in the idea particularly if, in order to re-establish a civilian government, parliament would have to be recalled which perhaps could be done without Lumumba or his oratory.10 This was also more attractive than the CIA planning to assassinate Lumumba with undesirable foreign recruits, or to provide arms to anti-Lumumba groups which Devlin was instructed to keep from any State Department representatives.11 The Cold War crux was summed up by Timberlake who noted that ‘we want parliamentary stamp of approval on government which will keep Soviet bloc and far left influence out of Congo’ (emphasis added).12
