ABSTRACT
This chapter analyzes how the sentiments known as moral emotions relate to a sense of ethical obligation. In recent years scholars have begun to place great emphasis on the role of emotion in behavioral ethics. This research has taken two broad perspectives, analyzing both the impact of emotion on individual moral judgments (e.g., Connolly & Hardman, 2009; Haidt, 2006; Shweder & Haidt, 1993), and the enforcement of moral norms (e.g., Ketelaar, 2006; Pillutla & Murnighan, 1996). Historically, these kinds of questions have tended to be posed at the level of individual psychology (cf., see Cropanzano, Stein, & Goldman, 2007; Folger & Salvador, 2008; Skitka, 2003). There is also, however, a long philosophical tradition of asking about the social group. In his Politics, Aristotle (350 b.c.e.) famously asserted that “man is by nature a political animal.” Most researchers agree with Aristotle’s view, in the sense of accepting that human beings are biologically and emotionally built for social living (e.g., Cacioppo & Patrick, 2008; Goleman, 2006) and that this influences our sense of what of is moral (Gazzaniga, 2008). Our analysis of this issue is organized around a question asked by Boehm (1999, p. 1): “Are we by nature hierarchical
or egalitarian?” These group-level questions have sparked answers ranging between the polar extremes indicated by our opening quotes from Thomas Hobbes (1651) and Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1762).
