ABSTRACT
Early in the course of undertaking empirical research on the sexual diversity of the judiciary in Australia, South Africa and England and Wales, I had to address a particular challenge that appeared to differentiate sexual diversity from other strands of diversity such as race, ethnicity, faith, disability and gender (Moran 2006). Sexuality, I was repeatedly told, was unlike the other strands of diversity. In short, sexuality is not, and ought not, to be taken into account. Other strands of diversity, informants told me, must be recorded and benchmarked, both being essential to monitor progress towards the desired (and in some instances legally required) objective of a more diverse judiciary. In sharp contrast, the message about sexuality was that it is and ought to remain absent. Some strands of diversity, these key informants seemed to suggest, have a desirable quality; they have come to represent a virtue of the institution. Sexual orientation does not.
