ABSTRACT

Some of the most basic problems in understanding the impetus and causation of radical violent takfiri jihadism 2 (RVTJ) are the lack of empirical data and actor focused ‘bottom-up’ perspectives of this phenomenon. Academics, policymakers and media commentators all try to make sense of who participates in Islamically inspired violent extremism with limited knowledge and little access to those who are actually participating (or have participated in the past) in this and related phenomena. Scholars such as Marc Sageman have identified the lack of empirics when considering phenomenon such as radicalization, and lamented the affect that this has on useful policymaking to help reduce the threat of Islamically inspired terrorism and political violence (Sageman 2007). The problem, in Sageman’s analysis, is due to an overemphasis by funders on ‘modelling’ violent extremism and radicalization, rather than a more methodologically sound scientifically based derivation of causation in light of observation.