ABSTRACT
In this book, we explore the diverse range of biological security issues that confront our globally interconnected world. We address conventional biological weapons threats, biological terrorism, and emerging infectious disease. We make the case for resilient local community responses that are linked globally. Resilient local community responses are as important or more important than treaties or conventions. Treaties, such as the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and the International Health Regulations 2005 (IHR 2005) have a role, but biological weapons, bioterrorism, and emerging diseases will continue to pose threats, which necessitates preparedness and response capabilities. Toward this end, the book assesses and synthesizes the important aspects of biological threats into a comprehensive multidisciplinary picture. In a strict sense, biosecurity involves issues dealing directly with microorganisms and toxins, such as prevention of emergence, loss, accidents, theft, or use, and the remediation after pathogenic damage. It addresses procedures and practices to help ensure that biological materials and relevant sensitive information remain secure and out of the hands of terrorists. But we have to be practical. We inevitably pay a price for security. By limiting access to facilities, research materials, and information, how can we avoid compromising scientific progress against naturally occurring microbial threats or the efficiency of running our enterprises in an increasingly competitive world? The U.S. Postal Service in 2003, for example, installed devices to check for airborne pathogens or poisons at the nation’s 271 mail-processing and distribution centers in Project BioShield. They have had several false alarms and have yet to detect a true threat. But does that mean they have little value? Are they merely an early exercise for the future? Some experts fear that a tenfold increase in laboratories authorized to work with dangerous biothreat agents increases the risk of leaks. The U.S. federal government has been funding a proliferation of these Biological Safety Level 3 and 4 (BSL) laboratories that deal with the deadliest of pathogens on an unprecedented scale. Is this necessary?
