ABSTRACT
Fifteen years after its creation, the ASEAN Regional Forum apparently is no different a security arrangement than it was in 1994. To be sure, both ARF activities and the number of those involved have expanded significantly. The strict emphasis on dialogue has slowly given way to shared appreciation that it should also translate into concrete practical cooperation. Nonetheless, its basic set-up, the guiding norms of multilateral exchanges and activities, and the nature of security cooperation remain essentially the same. Thus, the ARF still lacks a significant degree of institutionalization, ASEAN’s security culture continues to predominate despite concessions vis-à-vis non-ASEAN countries, and confidence building remains at the core of its security purpose. Undoubtedly, the momentum to see the ARF change has been building up; however, the question is whether it will be sustained. Despite the consensus over concrete and practical cooperation, the major powers are divided on how the ARF should move forward and all participants continue to pursue their particular agenda for the Forum. Glosserman argues that notwithstanding its frustration with the ARF’s limitations and the failure of participants to meaningfully embrace preventive diplomacy (PD), Washington remains interested in developing the Forum’s capacity to respond to regional security challenges, especially non-traditional or transnational security threats. In effect, Washington also still wants to use the Forum to engage China and promote regional as well as global policies in relation to specific issues areas such as counter-terrorism or non-proliferation. The pursuit of such objectives within the ARF is in part designed to demonstrate the significance that the United States attaches to ASEAN and to reassert America’s multilateral credentials in Southeast Asia in particular. Significantly, Hughes posits that while PRC decision makers may themselves subscribe to several principles associated with ASEAN’s security culture, Beijing draws on these principles underlying ARF multilateralism as strategic tools in pursuit of its national interests. Although it has taken on a more activist role in the Forum than could have been imagined at its outset, China in particular has not ceded any significant ground in relation to demands by non-ASEAN countries that moving from confidence
building to preventive diplomacy should happen more quickly. While Hughes’s chapter suggests that decision makers in Beijing will follow Washington some way in reviewing the ARF’s activities in relation to transnational challenges, their respective positions are not congruent. Indeed, China remains firmly encamped among the cautious, if not ‘reluctant’ states within the Forum, even if it has also demonstrated proactivity on transnational challenges like disaster relief. Similarly, Yuzawa emphasizes that Japan has been able to use the ARF to pursue certain foreign policy objectives, especially mutual reassurance. That said, Tokyo’s disappointment with the ARF has been considerable, not least because its efforts to mediate between ‘activist’ and ‘reluctant’ states have yielded but limited success in advancing the Forum’s security cooperation. While Tokyo may not rule out future improvement in security cooperation under ARF auspices, Japanese policy makers, at least for now, basically maintain a preference in the interim for forging strong bilateral security relations with key regional players. As illustrated for example by its enthusiasm for ReCAAP, Japan has also bypassed the ARF by promoting multilateral initiatives with operational dimensions. Following Ashizawa, frustration with the ARF was also a factor behind the emergence of the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue among Washington, Canberra, and Tokyo. That said the ARF should be expected to continue to enjoy political backing in the capitals of all the major regional powers. Glossermann, Hughes, Yuzawa, and Ashizawa all suggest that, on balance, the ARF remains an important forum for regional diplomacy from the perspective of the major powers. Collectively, the ASEAN countries have successfully clung on to the selfarrogated role of the ARF’s ‘primary driving force’. However, as Sukma’s chapter makes unmistakably clear, ASEAN’s own efforts at reinventing itself, partly in order to continue to justify this position, have not inspired great confidence. While ASEAN subscribes in declaratory terms to the ASEAN Political-Security Community and members can now boast to have ratified the ASEAN Charter, in reality ASEAN has not done much to reinforce its prerogative role. Essentially, ASEAN has acted defensively within the ARF. As various chapters underscore, ASEAN states are to some extent trying to accommodate concerns regarding the ARF’s substantive agenda and a more profound role for non-ASEAN countries. By directly addressing issues such as counter-terrorism, non-proliferation, or maritime security, ASEAN countries indicate their preparedness to respond positively and constructively to concerns pushed by the United States and regional allies. However, the question remains whether ASEAN’s limitations in conflict management will allow it to play a role other than confidence building. As Sukma said:
The ASEAN Charter, in its current form, will also not contribute much to the strengthening of ASEAN’s institutional capacity that would be
required if the purpose is to develop cooperation in the areas of preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution as mandated by the ASC.
