ABSTRACT
U.S. policy toward Asia has successfully internalized its own contradictions. Despite two centuries of focus and engagement – the United States had a Pacific presence before it even had a Pacific coast – the American public and policy makers still need to be reminded of the importance of the region to the country’s national interests. This, despite the fact that American soldiers have fought three wars in Asia and the U.S. maintains five bilateral military alliances with some 100,000 troops in the region. Meanwhile, Asia’s global economic role continues to grow as it absorbs ever-larger amounts of U.S. trade and investment. An engine of global prosperity, yet Asia is home to several nuclear weapons states, potential military flashpoints and territorial disputes, and lingering historical animosities. U.S. engagement with the region should be a given. But it is not. Asia’s potential instabilities should lead governments in the region to adopt every possible means to diminish tensions, build confidence, and construct security frameworks to handle potential crises. That process however has been slow and haphazard. This chapter looks at U.S. thinking about the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). It traces U.S. views of the ARF, factors shaping those assessments, and examines the role non-governmental efforts have played in shaping American thinking about the Forum. It concludes with brief thoughts about the U.S. experience in the ARF and factors that are likely to influence its future relationship with the Forum.
