ABSTRACT
The Indian army’s experience with fighting insurgencies is a matter of considerable institutional pride. It claims, plausibly, that it has had more experience with counterinsurgency than almost any other army in the world. In light of this experience, its famed Counterinsurgency and Jungle Warfare School (CIJW) has been attracting global attention. As part of the Indian military’s outreach efforts it imparts training at this school to militaries from countries such as the United States, Singapore, South Africa, Iraq, Afghanistan, and many others.1 The Indian army unveiled its doctrine for sub-conventional conflicts, better known as the ‘iron fist in a velvet glove’ strategy, with much fanfare in 2006. India’s experience with quelling insurgencies is even touted by some as a model to be emulated by the United States in its wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.2 But does the evidence support the facts? Is the Indian army that good at fighting insurgencies? I argue that while the army maybe good at the tactical level of operations, it is less
effective at the strategic level. This is primarily due to two factors-the unique structure and functioning of civil-military relations and the operational culture of the Indian military, which inhibits organizational learning. Despite these failings, however, the Indian state has displayed a slow, self-correcting mechanism. To complete this process more needs to be done. Structural changes are required in the way that Indian politicians, bureaucrats, and military officers interact with each other and within their organizations. Without these reforms, the Indian military’s self-ascribed rhetoric as the world’s best counterinsurgency force may remain just that-rhetoric. I begin with a short discussion on the broad characteristics and state response to India’s
insurgencies. Next I explain how civil-military relations have hampered the counterinsurgency campaigns. Then I discuss the operating culture of the Indian military and why it is constantly “relearning lost lessons.” Next, I examine the self-corrective measures that can be attributed to Indian democracy. Finally, I conclude with emphasizing four issues that should positively transform India’s counterinsurgency practice. While framing this study, I have chosen to focus primarily on the counterinsurgency campaigns waged by the Indian military. Hence, despite the severity of the threat, the Naxalite movement in central India is not included in this study.3 Moreover, this article does not dwell upon the specific causes of an insurgency or the details of individual counterinsurgency campaigns but is more concerned with analyzing the response of the state and the performance of the Indian military. In doing so, admittedly, there may be some sweeping generalizations that might not apply to all the case studies. Due to the vast scope of the topic and India’s numerous insurgencies, this problem is probably unavoidable. However, the broader conclusions and recommendations of this article still hold.
