ABSTRACT
Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines have been wracked by protracted local insurgencies almost since independence. At the heart of most of these insurgencies were political and economic over-centralization, exclusive definition of national identity, and repressive security policies. They were also fed by separatist aspirations of insurgent groups claiming historical, ethnic, and territorial distinctness as well as unjust colonial policies. This chapter looks at the conflicts in Aceh, the Southern Philippines, and Southern Thailand. It will focus on recent developments in both the conflicts and the negotiations. As the Aceh conflict is the only one to have been successfully transformed from a military one into a political one with a peace agreement that has held since August 2005, most of this chapter will analyse the Aceh peace process, the agreement, challenges of peace building and the prospects for the future. It will then discuss the less successful peace process in the Southern Philippines and the ongoing conflict in Southern Thailand. Three sets of arguments will be advanced: First, the Aceh negotiations succeeded
because the Indonesian government had set aside internal differences and was united behind the process. Further it succeeded because the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) changed its strategy into a political and incremental one, setting aside not only the armed struggle and its strategy of internationalization but also its goal of independence. Second, the peace process in the Philippines has all but collapsed because the Philippine government has succumbed to internal rivalries, the government negotiators have not received backing, and the government has been unwilling to address seriously the ancestral lands issue. At the same time the Moro insurgents are factionalized and their lack of control over the so-called “lost commands” and the presence of imbedded foreign Islamists make the MILF a problematic negotiating partner. And third, the conflict in Southern Thailand has become the victim of the Thai government’s preoccupation with the ongoing political crisis at the center and of the consequent political and bureaucratic inertia. However, even if the Thai government were ready for negotiations it would at present be difficult to discern whom they would talk to as the insurgents are fragmented into some seventeen groups with different agendas, ideologies, geographies, and not necessarily control over the violence on the ground.
