ABSTRACT
This paper presents a theory of the evolution of human morality by natural selection, and then expands the theory to formulate a parallel theory of religion. The theory of morality presented is a composite of ideas suggested by a number of theoreticians. 1 These theories and ideas, which I see as very similar at their core, all derive from the assumption that moral sentiments and the propensity to make moral judgments are a part of human nature, and that these sentiments and propensities derive ultimately from evolution driven by natural selection. They share, for the most part, two assumptions. The first assumption is that, in human evolution, natural selection has been sufficiently potent to create adaptation only at the individual level (and perhaps lower levels), not at the group level. This means that morality is seen as something that must have been advantageous for individuals in most ancestral populations. Group-level advantages favored by group selection are assumed not to have played a significant role in the evolution of morality. The second assumption is that morality is primarily a form of reciprocal altruism 2 and secondarily is a form of induced altruism (that is, altruism created by coercion or deception). The theory of religion presented here is my own, although I construct it in a direct logical way from earlier theories of morality, and base it on the same assumptions about individual-level selection, reciprocal altruism, and induced altruism.
