ABSTRACT
There is increasing acceptance that the European Union (EU) is becoming an important actor in foreign and security matters (Hill and Smith 2005; Keukeleire and MacNaughtan 2007; Meyer 2005; Smith 2004). A significant factor in the rising importance of EU security activities derived from the 1999 decision by EU leaders to add European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) to the scope of its security activities. As a consequence, the EU has not only improved its institutional and decision-making capacity, but has also augmented its policy activities in this field, especially through a number of civil—military missions in various parts of the globe. Apart from contributing to peace and stability in the European context through, for example, enlargement rounds and the European Neighbourhood Policy and Stability and Association Process for the Western Balkans, the EU has also extended its security activities to places as far afield as Africa (ESDP missions to the Democratic Republic of Congo) and Asia (ESDP mission to Aceh). Yet, while this phenomenon is unfolding, and while the so-called European Security Strategy of 2003 has identified perceived security threats to the EU and outlined a general response approach to these threats, few specific data exist on how EU decision-makers rank these threats or which instruments they deem appropriate for dealing with the ranked threats (Kirchner and Sperling 2002). It is the aim of this chapter to examine threat perceptions by EU elites across both military and non-military type of threats, and to explore which type of instruments EU policy-makers prefer in response to given threats. A further objective is to assess what importance policy-makers assign to the EU as a security actor, and whether a strengthened EU security dimension is viewed as detrimental to the role of North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and US commitments to European security.
