ABSTRACT
In the debate over self-determination for the South, two motives have driven those who have advocated the right of the people of the South to determine their destiny, in particular whether to remain in a united Sudan or become an independent state. The first motive is clearly that of those who want to break away from the North and become a separate state, an outcome which is generally not favored outside Southern Sudan. The second motive is of those who genuinely believe in the unity of the Sudan, but want to challenge the North, in particular the central government, to create conditions conducive to consensual unity. Unity would then be the choice of the people of the South, freely exercised through a referendum. The mere fact of the threat that the South might choose independence might motivate the North to make unity attractive enough for the people of the South to exercise their choice in favor of unity. That threat, if credible, would create sufficient leverage for radical reform. The situation in Abyei, which in many ways mirrors North-South relations,
poses a similar challenge in the relations between the dominant Missiriya majority, backed by the central government, and the disadvantaged Ngok Dinka minority. In reaction to their disadvantaged position in the North, the Ngok Dinka sentiments toward their kith and kin in the South have intensified. This led to their involvement on the side of the South in the first civil war, 1955-72. During the Addis Ababa negotiations of 1972, the anomalous position of Abyei, contested by both sides, was addressed by a provision in the Addis Ababa Agreement giving the Ngok Dinka the right to decide, through a referendum, whether to join the southern region or remain in Kordofan. That provision of the agreement was never implemented. Instead, the people of Abyei continued to be subjected to oppression and repression aimed at suppressing any tendencies toward joining the South. This situation eventually became intolerable, leading some of the sons and daughters of the area to start a rebellion that eventually fueled the resumption of hostilities and the return of the civil war between North and South. The current peace negotiations in Kenya under the auspices of IGAD and
its international partners, in which the Abyei situation is among the three marginal areas being discussed between the government and the SPLM/A to
determine their position vis à vis the North and the South, offers an opportunity to address this unfinished job. It would seem that the two motives above would apply. There are those who want the people of Abyei to be given the right to self-determination through a referendum, with the objective of eventually joining the South, whether within the framework of national unity or in full independence. There are also, however, those people who genuinely believe in the unity of the Sudan and see Abyei as a dynamic link between the North and the South, and therefore a microcosm that could reinforce national unity. This bridging position, in order to be genuine and effective, must be based on the consent of the people and not their domination, which can only fuel tension and provoke yet another explosion in North-South relations. The right of the people of Abyei to choose can be seen as a challenge for the people of Kordofan and the central government to create local conditions that would make the people of Abyei see being in the North as a beneficial bridge, and therefore opt for the unity of the Dinka and the Arabs in the area. To achieve this goal, several options are possible. First, the issue of primary
ownership and control of the land with clear borders must be established. While the borders of the Missiriya Arabs and the Ngok Dinka are known and should be reaffirmed, the traditional seasonal access by the nomadic Arab herders to sources of water and grazing must be guaranteed. Second, from an administrative point of view, if the Missiriya-Dinka area
remains a province, there should be two distinct districts controlled and run by the people of the area that reflect their respective territorial jurisdictions with the sharing of power at the provincial level. Ideally, despite the size of the territory and the population, Abyei should be elevated to the level of a state, thereby ensuring its autonomy. Failing that, a system of power and wealth sharing between the Ngok Dinka and the Missiriya Arabs in Western Kordofan state should be devised to ensure the protection of the Dinka minority against the Arab majority. Third, from the perspective of an appropriate law to apply in the Ngok
Dinka area, it is important to recall that Ngok autonomy in the North was largely premised on their cultural distinctiveness as an indigenous African group among Arab-Muslims. Accordingly, the Ngok Dinka were the only group in the North to which the 1932 Chiefs’ Courts Ordinance, which was applicable in the South, was applied by special order of the Governor General. This meant that African customary law applied to them, as opposed to Sharia or native law (an amalgam of custom and Islamic laws governed by the 1932 Native Courts’ Ordinance) in the North. The same principle would require applying to the Ngok Dinka the laws that are applicable in the South. Fourth, there is an urgent need to support the return of Ngok Dinka
internally displaced persons in the North and the South, safely and with dignity, to their home areas and to facilitate their integration with provision of services and development through a comprehensive program of repatriation, resettlement, and socioeconomic development. Such a program should be implemented in cooperation with indigenous NGOs such as the National
Development Organization (NDO) and Abyei Community Action for Development (ACAD), and with the support and facilitation of the local and national authorities, and funding from international donors. Fifth, over and above these political and administrative arrangements, in
order to strengthen the cooperation between the two areas, a Dinka-Missirya Council for Peace and Development should be created to promote peaceful coexistence, cross-cultural fertilization, and constructive cooperation in the economic, social, and cultural development of the region. Although this would require the mobilization of internal resources through a localized approach to development as a process of self-enhancement from within, to achieve its desired objectives for the peace and integration of the nation it would require substantial support from the central government and friends of the Sudan. Such support must be seen as a reinforcement of self-reliance and local ownership of the development process, and not a source of dependence and external control. Sixth, these scenarios of unity are premised on the country remaining
united, in which case Abyei can countinue to link the North and the South, wheter as a state or as an autonomous entity. Should the country be divided, and the South becomes an indipendent state, it is inconceivable that Abyei would want to remain in the North, and not join the South. That is why I would have preferred for the Southern Selfdetermination referendum to take place before the Abyei refrendum on whether to remain in the special administrative status under the Presidency or join the South. The fear, however, was that if the South opted for secession, the North might be even more motivated to prevent Abyei from joining the South. It should however be borne in mind that even if the North and the South were separated, the Ngok Dinka and the Missiriya Arabs would remain communities at the border and could still play a bridging role between the two states. One of the chiefs of the Ngok Dinka once said in a public gathering
attended by then President Jaafer Nimeiri that Abyei is like the eye, which, though so small, sees so much. By the same token, one can see this as a metaphor for the manner in which Abyei links various levels of the racial, ethnic, cultural, and religious diversities of the Sudan and brings them into microcosmic focus. Seen in reverse order, it means that while Abyei can be a force for unity and reconciliation, it also has the potential to be a point of confrontation, with ripple effects that can engulf the nation in violent conflict. These two possibilities are indeed reflected in the history of the area. The Sudan and all people of goodwill should help the Ngok Dinka and the neighboring Missiriya Arab tribes live up to the challenges of peace, security, stability, and cooperation for the good of their area and the country as a whole.
