Putnam opts for this possibility. “Nothing at all we say about any object describes the object as it is ‘in itself’ independently of its effect on us . . .” (Putnam 1981: 61). The idea that value can simply be deduced from properties has to be rejected.5 This statement does not deny that values or qualities can be objectively discussed; but it denies that it is possible to claim that there is one true result of a valuation process. Wiggins even claims that we have to treat psychological states and their objects as equal and reciprocal partners. Consequently, it can be true both that we desire X because we think X is good, and that X is good because we desire it (Wiggins 1998: 158-159).6 This claim goes much further than the idea that there are interdependencies. It undermines the idea of an interchange between intrinsic properties and the agent’s perception of it and has, therefore, to be rejected.